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Possession in Patent Law
I. INTRODUCTION
NE fundamental premise of patent law, according to the courts,
is that the system is a quid pro quo between the state and the
inventor; in exchange for disclosing his invention in the patent
itself, the inventor is granted the right to exclude others from practicing
the invention for a limited time.' Disclosure, therefore, is central to the
patent system.2 The courts have reasoned that the disclosure require-
ments in U.S. patent law are designed to further innovation by enhancing
the store of knowledge available to the public. 3 Other innovators can
rely on disclosures in patents and build upon that information. 4 In this
way, patents serve a teaching function, informing the public about the
invention.
The courts take the benefit of disclosure as a given in the quid pro quo
view of patents.5 Such an assumption may not be warranted. Evaluation
of the patent system suggests that the ability of patents to perform this
"teaching" function is rather limited. Moreover, such a function is incon-
sistent with other theoretical justifications for the patent system. In con-
trast to the quid pro quo view, the theoretical models used to explain the
need for a patent system-the public good and prospect theories-fail to
even acknowledge how enablement fits into the economics that underlie
1. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974) ("The more diffi-
cult objective of the patent law to reconcile with trade secret law is that of disclosure, the
quid pro quo of the right to exclude."); Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (Disclosure "satisfies the policy premises of the law, whereby the inventor's techni-
cal/scientific advance is added to the body of knowledge, as consideration for the grant of
patent exclusivity."); see also Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 496-97 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("The decision of Congress to adopt a patent system was based on the idea that there will
be much more innovation if discoveries are disclosed and patented than there will be when
everyone works in secret. Society thus fosters a free exchange of technological information
at the cost of a limited 17-year monopoly.").
2. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 2 1 ST CENTURY
36 (Stephen A. Merrill et. al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter PATENT SYSTEM] ("The quid pro quo
for giving the patent holder the right to exclude others is to compel disclosure of the inven-
tion in terms that enable others to replicate, modify, and circumvent it."); Mark A. Lemley,
Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 UC DAVIS L. REV. 225, 236 n.53 (2005); Note, The Dis-
closure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2011
(2005) (noting courts view disclosure as the "centerpiece of patent policy") [hereinafter
Disclosure Function].
3. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd/ v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting), vacated, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct.
2372 (June 13, 2005).
4. As Judge Newman noted in dissent:
The purpose of a patent system is not only to provide a financial incentive to
create new knowledge and bring it to public benefit through new products; it
also serves to add to the body of published scientific/technologic knowledge.
The requirement of disclosure of the details of patented inventions facilitates
further knowledge and understanding of what was done by the patentee, and
may lead to further technologic advance. The right to conduct research to





the system.6 More recent theoretical analyses of the patent system-sig-
naling and portfolio theories-require disclosure of some sort, but not at
the level for one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention. The
pervasiveness of disclosure obligations and their conspicuous absence in
the economic and legal scholarship warrant further inquiry.7
This article in Part II provides an overview of the disclosure obligations
in the United States, focusing primarily on enablement, the most robust
of the requirements. In Part III, the article examines the enablement re-
quirement's virtual absence in economic literature. Theoretically, the
patent system, by articulating the quid pro quo, requires a level of free-
riding that is contrary to the public good justification of patent law, un-
dermines certain aspects of the prospect theory, and is irrelevant to any
signaling function. Moreover, the enabling disclosures in patents do not
serve a teaching function particularly well. Due to a number of factors,
inventors are unlikely to review published patents and applications and,
thus, are generally unaware of the patents of others. The patent disclo-
sure itself does not directly foster further innovation. Enablement's abil-
ity to inform the public domain, therefore, appears to be, at best,
overstated by the courts.
Part IV of the article identifies a core, yet unde-rappreciated, concept
in patent law-possession. Possession of the invention conceptually per-
vades much of patent law doctrine, although it remains unnamed. Posses-
sion, though, is a rather nebulous concept. This article proposes that
enablement is the best mechanism by which to show possession, and this
view of the disclosure obligation is far more consistent theoretically and
doctrinally than the alleged "teaching" function of enablement. By shift-
ing to this view of enablement as possession, disclosure becomes theoreti-
cally consistent with the theories underlying patent law, and its
pervasiveness in patent law becomes clear. Part V reviews the current
uses-both express and implied-of enablement, and also posits other
areas of law where adoption of enablement as the standard would sim-
plify the law and hopefully add greater certainty.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISCLOSURE
OBLIGATIONS OF 35 U.S.C. § 112
Throughout the history of the U.S. patent system, courts have recog-
nized that the ultimate beneficiary of a patent is not the patentee but
instead the public, to whom the invention is disclosed instead of being
6. Mark Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the "Written Description"
Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 55,
57 (2000).
7. Others have also recognized the dearth of literature on the disclosure obligations
in patent law. See, e.g., id. ("[N]either courts nor commentators have ever satisfactorily
mapped the full contours of the enablement requirement much less the other extant disclo-
sure requirements.").
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kept a secret. 8 The courts therefore have embraced the quid pro quo
view of the patent system as a central tenet of patent law-patentees are
afforded the right to exclude others in exchange for the disclosure of their
inventions to the public through the patent. 9
The U.S. patent system has three primary disclosure requirements: en-
ablement, written description, and best mode. 10 The disclosure obliga-
tions in modern patent law are governed by the first paragraph of 35
U.S.C. § 112. Specifically, the patent act describes the following
requirements:
The specification shall contain [1] a written description of the inven-
tion, [2] and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and [3] shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.11
The following section explains these three separate obligations: written
description, enablement, and best mode.
A. WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
Clause [1] is the written description requirement, which requires an ap-
plicant to disclose in the patent specification a description of the inven-
tion that communicates to the person having ordinary skill in the art
("PHOSITA") that he possessed the invention at the time he filed his
application.1 2 The written description's primary function is to prevent an
applicant from adding new matter to the patent specification or, in other
words, to ensure that the patentee's claims are limited only to those em-
bodiments adequately disclosed in the application.13
The Federal Circuit has recently enhanced the role of the written
8. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989)
("Thus, from the outset, federal patent law has been about the difficult business 'of draw-
ing a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclu-
sive patent, and those which are not."') (quoting 13 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335
(Memorial ed. 1904)); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933)
("Thus a monopoly takes something from the people. An inventor deprives the public of
nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives something of value to the commu-
nity by adding to the sum of human knowledge."); Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag
Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908) ("And it was further said in that case that the inventor could
have kept his discovery to himself; but, to induce a disclosure of it, Congress has, by its
legislation, made in pursuance of the Constitution, guaranteed to him an exclusive right to
it for a limited time ....").
9. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same:
Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest for Predictability in the On-
Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 937 (2000) [hereinafter Holbrook, More Things
Change].
10. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (2000).
11. Id. (numerical notations added).
12. See, e.g., Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("To meet
this requirement, the disclosure of the earlier application, the parent, must reasonably con-
vey to one of skill in the art that the inventor possessed the later-claimed subject matter at




description requirement, however. 14 In a controversial move, the court
has applied the written description requirement to originally filed
claims. 15 Seemingly, originally filed claims are self-supporting and should
ipso facto satisfy the written description requirement because, by defini-
tion, no new matter has been added.16 The Federal Circuit, however, has
removed the written description requirement from its historical, new-
matter-policing role and now reasons that even originally filed claims can
violate the requirement if there is inadequate support in the rest of the
specification to show that the applicant possessed the invention.17 Critics
of the court's jurisprudence view this shift in doctrine as creating a "super
enablement" requirement, particularly in the context of biotechnology,
which is where the court primarily has utilized the enhanced written
description requirement.' 8 This move has not gone unnoticed by some
judges on the Federal Circuit, who have questioned whether there even is
a written description requirement separate from enablement, which is
found in part [2] of § 112, 1.19 Presently, the written description and
enablement requirements remain distinct. 20
B. ENABLEMENT-HOW TO MAKE AND USE THE INVENTION
Clause [2] contains the enablement requirement, which requires that
the disclosure teach the PHOSITA how to make and use the invention.21
It guarantees that, once the patent term expires, others will be able to
practice the invention freely based strictly on the patent disclosure.22 A
patent is enabled if the PHOSITA can practice the invention without un-
due experimentation. 23 This standard is the key disclosure obligation be-
cause, under the quid pro quo, it guarantees that the public will be in
possession of the knowledge of how to practice the invention.24 Enable-
ment is, in fact, the only disclosure obligation required under the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS"). 25
14. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567-68
(Fed. Cir. 1997). See generally Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written
Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615
(1998) [hereinafter Mueller, Evolving Application].
15. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 119 F.3d at 1567-68.
16. Mueller, Evolving Application, supra note 14, at 635-36.
17. Id. at 629-33.
18. Id. at 633.
19. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
20. Id. at 981.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (2000).
22. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933) ("An
exclusive enjoyment is guaranteed him for seventeen years, but upon the expiration of that
period, the knowledge of the invention enures to the people, who are thus enabled without
restriction to practice it and profit by its use.").
23. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
24. Janis, supra note 6, at 55-56.
25. See TRIPS, art. 29, 1 ("Members shall require that an applicant for a patent
disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be
carried out by a person skilled in the art...") (emphasis added); see also Janis, supra note
6, at 55-56 ("It is equally unsurprising that enablement is one of the international minimum
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The enablement standard contains two components: the disclosure
must disclose both how to make and how to use the invention. The "how
to use" prong is actually more a reflection of the requirement that an
invention have utility.26 The PTO treats "how to use" rejections as viola-
tions of both sections 112 and 101.27 This distinction rarely is important
in mechanical devices, but can be crucial in the chemical arts. An inven-
tor may have isolated a new chemical and a method of preparing that
chemical, but she may not yet know of a use for the chemical. While her
disclosure could teach how to make the chemical, it would fail the "how
to use"/utility patentability requirement.28 Thus, "how to make" is more
properly considered the key enablement disclosure obligation.
Enablement under § 112 obligates the patent applicant to disclose his
invention in a way that allows one of ordinary skill in the art to practice
the invention.29 The courts, however, have made clear that satisfaction of
the enablement requirement does not preclude the PHOSITA from ex-
perimenting at all.30 Some level of experimentation is still permitted, but
when those experiments become "undue," then the disclosure is insuffi-
cient.31 The courts have identified a number of factors relevant to assess-
ing whether any experimentation would be undue:
1) The quantity of experimentation necessary;
2) The amount of direction or guidance presented;
3) The presence or absence of working examples;
4) The nature of the invention;
5) The state of the prior art;
6) The relative skill of those in the art;
7) The predictability or unpredictability of the art; and
8) The breadth of the claims. 32
Enablement, while conceptually simple, is legally and factually complex.
To further complicate matters, whether a disclosure is enabling can shift
over time; as the knowledge of the PHOSITA shifts, an identical disclo-
standards for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") - compli-
ant patent systems .. "). Countries are permitted, but not required, to include the re-
quirement of disclosing the best mode of practicing the invention. Id. Japan, Europe, and
many other systems, unlike the United States, do not require disclosure of the inventor's
best mode. JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 77 (2003); Timothy
R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the United
States' Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 41 n.62 (2004).
26. Process Control Corp. v. Hydreclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
27. See, e.g., id.; see also Holbrook, More Things Change, supra note 9, at 968-69. This
distinction can also be important in the context of conception of an invention, where the
inventor must be able to communicate how to make the invention but not necessarily the
utility of the invention. See id. at 980-81.
28. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This distinction is also
important with respect to the enablement's role in anticipation. See infra notes 152-194
and accompanying text; see also Rasmusson v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318,
1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
29. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
30. Id. at 736-37.
31. Id.; see Holbrook, More Things Change, supra note 9, at 975-76.
32. Wands, 858 F.2d at 737.
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sure may shift from not being enabled to being enabled.33 It is truly more
of a standard than a bright-line legal rule. Given the complexity of the
issue, and its root in the knowledge of the PHOSITA, a lack of certainty
may be appropriate.
C. BEST MODE
Finally, clause [3] contains the best mode requirement, which obligates
patent applicants to subjectively disclose what the inventor believes is the
best method of practicing the invention, if there is one.34 The idea behind
the best mode requirement is to prevent the patentee from retaining as a
trade secret the best manner of practicing the embodiment, while disclos-
ing only inferior approaches to the public in order to retain a competitive
advantage.35 Best mode is optional under TRIPS,36 but has been harshly
criticized as failing to serve the policy purposes for which it exists. 37 The
United States is the only country that contains a best mode require-
ment,38 leading many to call for its abolition. 39
Accordingly, of the three disclosure requirements contained within
§ 112, enablement is primarily responsible for the "teaching" function re-
quired by the quid pro quo view of patents.40 It is indeed the only disclo-
33. See Ramusson, 413 F.3d at 1326-27 (giving an application a date of priority at the
point the same disclosure became enabling to the PHOSITA). The case is different than
the use of written description to control priority by precluding new matter. New matter
was not at issue; instead, a disclosure that was insufficient when originally filed eventually
became sufficient with later continuation applications because the knowledge in the art had
evolved.
34. See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Schein Pharms., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
( "Unlike enablement, the existence of a best mode is a purely subjective
matter depending upon what the inventor actually believed at the time the
application was filed. Because of the subjective nature of the best mode in-
quiry, the best mode disclosure requirement-unlike enablement-cannot be
met by mute reference to the knowledge of one of skill in the art. The reason
is pragmatic. It is unreasonable if not impossible to require the ordinary arti-
san to peer into the inventor's mind to discover his or her idiosyncratic pref-
erences as of the filing date.").
Technically, best mode involves a two-step inquiry: first, does the inventor subjectively
possess the best mode and, second, if so, has he communicated that mode in a manner so as
to enable objectively one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the best mode. See N.
Telecom, Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
35. In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962) ("Manifestly, the sole purpose of this
latter requirement is to restrain inventors from applying for patents while at the same time
concealing from the public preferred embodiments of their inventions which they have in
fact conceived."); see also MUELLER, supra note 25, at 76-77. The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals is one of the predecessor courts to the Federal Circuit, and its precedent is
binding on the Federal Circuit unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court. See S.
Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
36. TRIPS art. 29 1 ("Members ... may require the applicant to indicate the best
mode for carrying out the invention known to the inventor .... ").
37. See, e.g., PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 120-21. But see Jerry R. Selinger, In
Defense of "Best Mode": Preserving the Benefit of the Bargain for the Public, 43 CATH. U.
L. REV. 1071, 1071-72, 1096-97 (1994).
38. PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 121; MUELLER, supra note 25, at 77.
39. PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 121. The current patent reform bill in Congress
would eliminate the best mode requirement. See H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005).
40. Janis, supra note 6, at 55-57.
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sure obligation mandated under international law.41 One member of the
Federal Circuit considers enablement to be "arguably the most important
patent doctrine after obviousness. '42 Enablement is undeniably a central
tenet of patent law, both in the United States and abroad.43
III. THE "TEACHING" FUNCTION OF ENABLEMENT-
REALITY OR MYTH?
Although enablement is the key disclosure obligation, its role as
"teaching" an invention to the public in the patent system's quid pro quo
justification merits further exploration, which previous literature has ig-
nored. Also conspicuously absent is any analysis of enablement's role in
the other theoretical analyses of patent law-the reward theory, prospect
theory, and portfolio theory. Little academic literature has explored or
theorized the role of enablement in these various theories, a conspicuous
absence given the central role that the doctrine plays. This section will
explore this previously undertheorized area of patent law.
A. THE QUID PRO Quo VIEW OF PATENT DISCLOSURES
In the eyes of the courts, the primary function of the patent system is to
promote public welfare through the disclosure of new inventions. 44 This
benefit to the public is twofold. First, the patent gives an incentive to
create and market the invention, which benefits the public, even if the
public must pay monopoly prices. A highly priced invention is better
than no invention at all. Second, the public benefits from the disclosure
of the invention because the public storehouse of knowledge is thus en-
hanced, allowing others to rely upon the teachings of the patent to gener-
ate even further, follow-on innovation. The Federal Circuit has embraced
this latter view as an important function of patents, recognizing that ef-
forts to "design around" a patent do not undermine the value of patents
and indeed are laudable. 4 5
The courts have relied on this policy justification as the primary reason
for the patent system.46 The courts have trumpeted this policy as the sole
41. Id.
42. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
43. Janis, supra note 6, at 55 (describing enablement as "the principal doctrine speak-
ing to the adequacy of a patentee's disclosure").
44. See Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain
Metaphor after Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1319-21 (2004).
45. See, e.g., Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that
"patent law encourages competitors to design around"); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Designing around is a function of demonstrating
possession of the invention, as opposed to exposing the public to new and better ideas.
This is demonstrated by the Federal Circuit's increasing use of public notice as the domi-
nant policy driving patent law. See infra notes 233-258 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 594
(C.C.P.A. 1977) (Markey, C.J., dissenting) ("How exaltive of form over substance. How
illustrative of stare decisis rampant. The board is saying that it doesn't matter that one
2006]
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justification for patents, giving virtually no attention to other theories of
patent law that have garnered far greater attention by scholars. The liter-
ature has not thoroughly addressed how a teaching role for patents fits, if
at all, into these other theories of patent law.
B. ENABLEMENT'S "TEACHING" ROLE IN PATENT THEORY-
OR LACK THEREOF
There has been a robust discussion of economic justifications for patent
law. The literature is rich in discussing how the patent system operates to
combat the public good nature of information and the potential for
wasteful, duplicative races to innovate and to commercialize. Essentially
absent from almost all of this literature, however, is a discussion of the
role that the disclosure obligations, and particularly enablement, play in
these theories. Review of these theories demonstrates that disclosure is,
in fact, in considerable tension with these justifications for the patent
system.
1. The Inconsistencies between a Teaching Function and the Incentive
or "Reward" Theory
The classic justification for a patent system is that patents are needed
to counter the public good nature of information. Public goods are things
that can be freely copied by others, and consumption by one person does
not deplete the resource.47 Without a patent, competitors could copy the
invention at relatively low cost and free ride on the original creator's
work without incurring the now-sunk research and development costs of
the original creator.48 This free-riding would allow competitors to sell the
good at a lower price than the original innovator. From an ex ante per-
spective, such free-riding reduces the incentive for anyone to engage in
the research and development of the good in the first place-why bother
to spend the resources if competitors will be able to undersell you? 4 9 Pat-
ents, therefore, give an incentive to innovate by allowing the inventor to
recover her research and development costs during the patent term, and
discloses an invention in such 'clear, concise and exact terms' (enablement) as to enable its
practice, the very purpose and quid pro quo of the patent system from its inception.").
47. See Ghosh, supra note 44, at 1332; Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justi-
fications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CM. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004) [hereinafter Lemley,
Justifications]; Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, , 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 994-95 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Economics of
Improvement].
48. Lemley, Justifications, supra note 47, at 129-30.
49. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439, 439-40 (2004); Lemley, Justifications, supra note 47, at 29-30. Criticisms of this
theory exist. Indeed, the absence of a patent system would not destroy all innovation. An
innovator may be able to recoup her sunk costs as a result of other market phenomena,
such as the first-mover advantage and network effects. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lem-
ley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1584-88 (2003) (discussing non-
patent innovation incentives).
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the patentee is rewarded with a patent for her innovation.50
What role, then, does the teaching function of the enablement require-
ment play in this system? Seemingly none. Requiring the inventor to
teach others how to make and use the invention does not serve to combat
the public good nature of information. To the contrary, the quid pro quo
of disclosure for protection encourages the dissemination of informa-
tion.51 One can envision a system where the patent is published at expiry,
allowing the patent holder to maintain secrecy over the invention while
procuring the rents to compensate for her investment. Litigation could
take the form of trade secret litigation, where the details of the invention
are not disclosed to the public. This approach would preserve the func-
tion of protecting against the public good problem, yet patents are cur-
rently published at issuance and generally eighteen months after the
patent application is filed.52 Indeed, pre-grant publication severely un-
dermines the incentive theory of patent law. While it provides notice to
competitors of what the inventor intends to claim, it also disseminates the
invention to the public at an early point in the process. The informa-
tion-the public good-is thus released to the public before patent pro-
tection officially begins. As a matter of policy, therefore, the disclosure
in the patent is not designed solely to ensure competition once the patent
has expired but instead to enrich the state of the art contemporaneously
with the invention. Such a function is in tension, if not antithetical, to the
incentive theory of patent law.
In fact, the courts have in fact lauded the use of the patent system to
encourage "design around" innovation, where a competitor alters the
patented invention in a way so as to be outside the patent claims. 53 De-
signing around is a form of incremental innovation. The quid pro quo
view of the patent system, therefore, contemplates at least a limited form
of free-riding; the competitor may be able to use the patent disclosure to
create the incremental innovation at a lower cost than discovering the
invention independently. Moreover, the competitor may be able to enter
the market at a lower price, allowing her to compete more rigorously with
the patent holder. The disclosure requirements, and particularly enable-
ment, therefore, run counter to the incentive theory of patent law.
Professor Katherine Strandburg recognized this tension between the
incentive to innovate and the incentive to disclose (quid pro quo) theories
of the patent system.54 Professor Strandburg recognized that the "incen-
tive to disclose" theory is really only implicated for non-self-disclosing
50. Edmund Kitch dubbed this the "reward" theory. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Na-
ture and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977).
51. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 635 (2002) ("Inventors
are assumed to suffer losses when information is made public, a loss exclusive rights at-
tempt to compensate.").
52. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(d), 122(b) (2000). But see infra notes 120-136 and accompa-
nying text (discussing problems created by provisional rights).
53. See supra note 45.
54. Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the
Patent Bargain, Wis. L. REV. 81, 105 (2004). Professor Strandburg's article does not ad-
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inventions where patent protection would afford greater returns on the
innovation than simply maintaining a trade secret, although trade secret
protection alone was sufficient to induce creation of the innovation. 55 In
other words, the patent system was not needed to incentivize the creation
of the invention because trade secret law was sufficient.56 The patent
system, by affording a greater return than trade secret protection, would
encourage the inventor to disclose the invention, but the "reward" theory
would be irrelevant to the actual creation of the invention.57 The patent
system's role, therefore, would be to encourage disclosure. 58
Only non-self-disclosing inventions are implicated by this analysis.
This set of inventions seemingly would be small. Moreover, the only in-
ventions that would be disclosed under the patent system are the subset
of non-self-disclosing innovations for which patent protection affords
more return than trade secret protection.5 9 If the invention is truly non-
self-disclosing, the only scenario for which patent protection is more eco-
nomically beneficial than trade secret protection is if the innovator be-
lieves others will independently create the innovation during the patent
term.60 If others will not independently create the product, then trade
secret protection would afford greater returns to the innovator, making
rational the decision not to obtain a patent.61 Patents provide protection
against independent creation, whereas trade secrets do not.62 If the prob-
lem is independent creation, however, the disclosure in the patent is ad-
ding very little to the public's knowledge base; others are readily able to
create the invention from the state of the art without the benefit of the
patent disclosure. 63 The patent has taught very little to the public: the
invention was inevitably coming to the public regardless of the patent
dress the intersection of either the prospect or signaling theory with enablement, as I ad-
dress infra.
55. Id. at 110-11.
56. Some economists, however, take a stricter view of the incentive theory, believing
that only those inventions actually induced by the patent system deserve patent protection.
See A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents-the Not-Quite-Holy Grail,
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 277 (1996) ("A causal relationship is required between the
availability of the patent system and the creation of the invention: But for the patent sys-
tem the invention would not have been made available to be public."). Economists would
view the patent monopoly as creating social waste if the patent was not needed to induce
creation of the invention. Professor Strandburg's response would be that social welfare
may yet be enhanced if the patent system encouraged disclosure of the invention so as to
facilitate greater innovation, in other words to facilitate the teaching function of patents.
The value of such disclosure, however, appears to be minimal. See infra notes 96-142 and
accompanying text.
57. Stanburg, supra note 54, at 110.
58. Id. at 111 ("It is in this set of circumstances, and this set of circumstances alone,that te so-called 'quid pro quo of patent disclosure' operates."); see also Disclosure Func-
tion, supra note 2, at 2015 (noting patent protection is helpful if others easily could reverse
engineer the invention).
59. Strandburg, supra note 54, at 110-11.
60. Id. at 113.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 334 n.24 (7th Cir. 1984).
63. Disclosure Function, supra note 2, at 2016.
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disclosure.64 The fact that the patent system has encouraged disclosure,
therefore, does not necessarily mean that the patent document itself will
serve the purported teaching function that is tied to the disclosure. 65
Consequently, the incentive to innovate theory is in considerable ten-
sion with the quid pro quo aspect of the patent system. The enablement
requirement insists on a level of free-riding that is inconsistent with the
role of patents to combat the public goods problem associated with inno-
vation. Nothing about the public good story requires the need for an
enabling disclosure of the invention, and indeed the free-riding aspect of
a patent "teaching" something to the public of value that can be used
before the expiration of the patent term seems utterly inconsistent with
this theory.
2. The Irrelevancy of a Teaching Function to Prospect Theory
In 1977, Edward Kitch proposed an alternative function of the patent
system, rooting his justification in property theory. 66 Kitch noted that
broad patents frequently are awarded for innovations at an early stage of
development. 67 On this foundation, innovators subsequently create com-
mercially viable inventions. 68 Analogizing to the prospect system for pre-
cious minerals in the eighteen hundreds,69 Kitch reasoned that issuing
broad patents at an early point in development allows the first innovator
to coordinate further downstream innovation in the nascent technology. 70
Kitch treats a "prospect" in the patent context as "a particular opportu-
nity to develop a known technological possibility. '71 Early patenting
therefore reduces wasteful races to invent. 72 Without earlier patenting,
the duplicative efforts of competitors could dissipate any social surplus
associated with the invention.73 The first to the patent office would win
all rights to the invention, while competitors would have wasted the re-
sources in developing a commercially viable embodiment of the inven-
tion. Under Kitch's view, the existence of the patent creates an after-the-
fact incentive for further innovation through the encouragement of in-
64. See id. at 2016 ("The primary function of the patent system is to protect inventions
that are easy to reverse engineer, but information on such technology is usually available
without the disclosure requirement."). Indeed, if the reason the return on the trade secret
would be less than patent protection is from the disclosure, the trade secret holder would
simply maintain the trade secret.
65. See infra notes 96-142 and accompanying text.
66. Kitch, supra note 50, at 267.
67. Id. Kitch argued that the importance of the prospect function of patents is seen in
three features of the system: the scope of the awarded patent is not commensurate with the
scope of the inventor's discovery; the priority and statutory bar rules encourage early pat-
enting; and the PTO has issued many important technological patents well before the in-
vention was ready for commercial exploitation. Id.
68. Id. at 271.
69. Id. at 271-75.
70. Id. at 276.
71. Id. at 266.
72. Duffy, supra note 49, at 440-41.
73. Id. at 440.
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vestment to develop the technology. 74
Any supposed teaching function via disclosure, however, plays no role
in prospect theory. Kitch's view assumes that the patentee will be able to
coordinate additional development of the technology, which suggests that
control over the information would be required to prevent other competi-
tors from designing around the invention or developing patentable im-
provements. 75 The teaching function of the disclosure is at odds with the
concept of a patent as a prospect because the quid pro quo view assumes
that use of the information by others is socially good and should be en-
couraged. Indeed, Kitch specifically distinguishes any teaching function
from the views articulated in his article.76 The disclosure obligations are
consequently irrelevant to prospect theory; the prospect function would
work without any obligation to disclose information. 77
3. Disclosure but No Teaching in Patent Signaling and Portfolio
Theory
Patents serve other purposes aside from privatizing information pursu-
ant to the incentive and prospecting theories. Recent scholarship has
demonstrated that patents can operate in the markets as a signal that
"credibly publiciz[es] information. '78 The incentive and prospect theo-
ries concentrate on privatizing information surrounding the patent in or-
der to allow the inventor to capture the rents associated with the
exclusive rights afforded by the patent.79 The quid pro quo view of pat-
ents requires disclosure of the invention but creates the incentive to dis-
close the minimum required to obtain patent protection.80 In fact, "if an
inventor could reap the same rents regardless of whether the invention
was protected by a patent," then the inventor rationally would not choose
74. Kitch, supra note 50, at 276-77; see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 49, at 1600
("[Prospect theory] emphasizes the ability of intellectual property ownership to force the
efficient management of inventions and creations through licensing once they are made.").
Subsequent commentators have further refined Kitch's prospect theory. John Duffy ob-
served that Kitch failed to account for the limited term of patent rights. Thus, the prospect
function is temporally limited. If patents are granted on early inventions, before they are
commercially viable, then the patent term effectively will be reduced. This temporal aspect
of patents makes the patent prospect begin to resemble Demseztian auctions, where the
right to develop a technology would be granted before anyone races to develop the tech-
nology, avoiding wasteful duplicative races. Duffy, supra note 49 at 439-40.
75. See Duffy, supra note 49, at 442-43 (explaining the concept and economic waste of
blocking patents).
76. Kitch, supra note 50, at 278 ("This private incentive to disseminate information
about the invention should be distinguished from the reward for disclosure theory tradi-
tionally discussed. That theory assumes that the disclosure effect of the patent system
comes from the disclosure on the public record.").
77. The communication involved in Kitch's theory requires a demonstration of what
the inventor has created. The role of disclosure to show possession, and not to teach,
would be relevant, but the communication discussed by Kitch is not limited to the patent
disclosure. Patentees have the incentive to communicate their discovery in any manner,
not simply through the patent document itself.
78. Long, supra note 51, at 627.
79. Id. at 626.
80. Id.
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patent protection.8' This theory is belied by the plethora of valueless pat-
ents that have been issued. Signaling and patent portfolio theories both
seek to explain this seemingly irrational behavior.
Instead of simply focusing on the exclusive rights of patents, these the-
ories suggest that persons obtain patents not solely for the right to ex-
clude others. The existence of a patent or, more likely, a set of related
patents can communicate information about the firm, the firm's research
interests, and capabilities to attract investors.8 2 These patent signals re-
duce information costs by acting as a proxy for data about a corporation
through a relatively inexpensive mechanism. 83 The signal may not trans-
mit perfect information, but its relative cheapness helps communicate
useful information to the market. Accordingly, patents individually and
collectively can provide information to relevant markets, such as venture
capital markets, about a firm.84 If patents can serve as such signals, then
the explosion of patents, particularly seemingly valueless patents, is ra-
tional because the value of obtaining the patent comes not from its exclu-
sive rights but instead from the reduced information costs in
communicating information about the firm, a form of advertising. 85
The portfolio can also act as a gestalt to create a "superpatent" that
preserves a research area for the patent holder. In a manner akin to pros-
pect theory-which focuses on the scope of an individual patent-portfo-
lio theory suggests that a set of closely related patents can allow a firm to
occupy the field and thus coordinate downstream innovations. 86 A varied
portfolio can also help minimize uncertainty relating to patents, such as
the scope or validity of a patent or even of patent law itself.87 The value
of any individual patent, however, is essentially irrelevant. What is im-
portant is the value of the portfolio as a whole, and the portfolio may
very well have a value greater than the sum of the value of its constituent
patents. 88
While patents may reduce information costs, the role of the patent doc-
ument to disclose something new to the public is irrelevant to both signal-
ing and portfolio theories. While serving as a form of advertising in a
81. Id.
82. Id. at 646.
83. Id. at 645 ("A signal in this context is just a variable with low measurement costs
that observers believe is not independently distributed relative to variables presenting high
measurement costs.").
84. Id. at 646 ("Individual patents and patent portfolios can signal many things. Indi-
vidual patents can convey information directly and credibly about the invention. Patent
portfolios can convey information about the lines of research a firm is conducting and how
quickly the research is proceeding. The quantity and quality of the patents in the portfolio
can serve as a signal of other firm attributes, as can the order in which the firm applies for
the patents.").
85. Id. at 635 ("If inventors might gain from publicizing information in a patent, then
they may choose to seek patent protection, even if the anticipated value of the exclusive
rights received in return were zero.").
86. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
7-8 (2005).
87. Id. at 8.
88. Id. at 9.
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sense, the particular disclosure of any given patent is not terribly relevant
to the signal.8 9 The disclosure of any single patent is likely irrelevant in
market signaling theory because evaluating the contents of the patent for
accuracy would greatly increase costs, undermining the efficiency gains of
the signal.90
Portfolio theory further undermines the teaching role of the patent dis-
closure. Portfolio theory does not emphasize patent disclosures but in-
stead emphasizes the existence of patents and the types of patents being
obtained. 9 1 Indeed, in portfolio theory, it is the quantity of patents that is
important, not necessarily the teachings within that set. 92 Evaluating ex-
tensive patent portfolios one patent at a time would be quite costly in
terms of sheer numbers and would risk eviscerating the reduced informa-
tion costs the patent portfolios supposedly provide.
Moreover, others are not attempting to build on the patent's disclosure
under either of these theories. The audience of signaling theory is com-
pletely different than that of the quid pro quo view of the patent system.
The relevant audience for signals is investors, whereas the relevant audi-
ence under disclosure theory is technologists. 93 The signal to the market
is not to advance the state of the art of the market but instead to reap
pecuniary benefits to the signaler. 94 The signal primarily communicates
information about the firm and not necessarily much about the
invention.95
Consequently, patent portfolio is not concerned with the teaching func-
tion that the patent disclosure allegedly provides. While disclosing some-
thing is far more relevant to the signaling theory than the incentive and
prospect theories, it is not tied to any enhancement of knowledge af-
forded by releasing the information to the public.
89. Long, supra note 51, at 665-66.
90. See id. at 665 ("Although they may reduce information costs, patents and portfo-
lios present their own set of information costs .... A firm's claim that it has patented a
new scientific discovery is easy to verify along one margin (the discovery is patented), but
presents higher verification costs along others (whether it is truly new or innovative).").
Patents may contain other, non-technical information that the market may find valuable.
See id. at 647 ("Readers can often discover such tidbits as what kinds of experiments the
patentee conducted in the course of testing the invention, what the experimental results
were, and what complementary products (often mentioned by brand name) the patentee
recommends for use with the invention."). But this disclosure has nothing to do with ad-
vancing the state of the art through the patent itself.
91. Id. at 648 ("Portfolios can indicate lines of research the firm is undertaking and
what the firm does and doesn't consider valuable, outline a research trajectory that adum-
brates fields the firm may be branching into next, disclose how fast the firm is proceeding
within a particular area of research, and reveal other valuable dynamic information.").
92. Id. at 648-49.
93. This fact further increases the information costs associated with evaluating an indi-
vidual patent for an investor: the patent is written for the PHOSITA and not for venture
capitalists or other investors.
94. Long, supra note 51, at 648-49.
95. Id.
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C. Do PATENTS ACTUALLY "TEACH" ANYTHING? PRACTICAL
REASONS TO DOUBT THE EFFICACY OF THIS FUNCTION
The quid pro quo justification for patent law suggests that patents en-
hance the storehouse of knowledge not only by the presence of the inven-
tion's physical embodiment in the market but also by the injection of this
new knowledge into the public domain. None of the economic justifica-
tions for patents, however, support the need for disclosure. Moreover, it
is not clear that patents under the status quo even could perform a teach-
ing function effectively. For a variety of reasons, the courts have grossly
overstated the teaching function of patent disclosures. The patent system
has a number of structural flaws that inhibit the ability of a patent to
perform its teaching function.
1. Experimental Use Limitations-Limited Opportunity to Learn
Patents do contain a wealth of information, and, theoretically, follow-
on innovators could rely upon that disclosure to improve upon or design
around a patented invention.96 The courts seem to blindly assume that
patents do perform this function. In order to utilize the information in
the patent, one must be able to investigate the invention itself. Even the
enablement standard itself contemplates the possibility of experimenta-
tion; the requirement is satisfied so long as experiments to use or under-
stand the invention are not undue. Thus, to facilitate design-around and
improvement innovation, one would expect a safe harbor for inventors to
experiment with the invention.
Superficially, U.S. patent law does recognize such a safe harbor for ex-
perimentation in two forms. According to common law, inventors are
exempt from infringement liability if their use of the invention was
"solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophi-
cal inquiry. '97 Moreover, the Patent Act provides a specific statutory de-
fense for uses of an invention in order to prepare applications for
approval by the government. 98 These two forms of experimental use will
be discussed in turn.
a. Common Law Experimental Use Defense
Despite the long history of the common law experimental use defense,
the Federal Circuit has essentially eviscerated it. Commentators have
96. Designing around is more of a possession concern, allowing the public to discern
the scope of the right to exclude based on what the inventor possesses. Likely, the infor-
mation disclosed in the patent is not necessarily new.
97. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). "Philosophical in-
quiry," given its proper historical context, actually refers to scientific inquiry. See Janice
M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent In-
fringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and Development,
56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 929 (2004) [hereinafter Mueller, Evanescent Experimental Use].
For a general discussion of the evolution of the common law experimental use defense, see
id. at 927-36.
98. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2005).
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well documented the Federal Circuit's hostility to the common law exper-
imental use defense, 99 which will only briefly be repeated here. In Madey
v. Duke University, the court concluded that the use of the invention by
Duke University was not shielded by the experimental use defense be-
cause the use had commercial implications. 100 The "commercial" impli-
cation, though, was utterly irrelevant to the particular invention at issue;
instead, the University's commercial interest was "educating and enlight-
ening students and faculty participating in these projects" and "[increas-
ing] the status of the institution and [luring] lucrative research grants,
students and faculty." 101 Prior to Madey, many universities believed that
the experimental use exception applied to them, but the Federal Circuit
made clear that even educational institutions are not immune from in-
fringement. Moreover, the court's broad interpretation of the commer-
cial nature of the use makes envisaging any use that would qualify for the
defense nearly impossible.
The absence of an effective experimental use defense severely limits
the ability of the patent disclosure to "teach" anything. One can read the
patent but cannot make or use the invention for purposes of exploring its
function or the manner in which it works. 10 2 Unless the courts or Con-
gress create a more robust experimental use defense, the ability of the
patent disclosure to teach anything of worth to the public is curtailed.10 3
b. Safe Harbor of § 271(e)(1)-Statutory Experimental Use
Defense
Congress, in contrast to the common law experimental use defense, has
provided a limited statutory defense related to the use of patented inven-
tions for experimental purposes. Section 271(e)(1) provides the
following:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or
sell within the United States or import into the United States a pat-
99. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1023-24 (1989) [hereinafter Eisen-
berg, Progress]; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Bio-
technology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 220-24 (1987); Mueller, Evanescent Experimental
Use, supra note 97, at 962-71; Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76
WASH. L. REV. 1, 22-24 (2001); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in
Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1194 (2000); Strandburg, supra note 54, at 97-99.
100. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362-63.
101. Id. at 1362.
102. Seemingly, a use to demonstrate that the invention does not actually work could be
problematic as well, notwithstanding the public interest in invalidating such a flawed
patent.
103. Commentators have offered a number of suggestions for implementing a more
balanced experimental use defense. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Progress, supra note 99, at 1078
(articulating three circumstances eligible for the experimental use defense); Mueller, Eva-
nescent Experimental Use, supra note 97, at 972-79 (articulating statutory experimental use
factors); O'Rourke, supra note 99, at 1205 (articulating five factor, fair use analysis analo-
gous to copyright fair use); Strandburg, supra note 54, at 119-21 (advocating a "experi-
menting on" versus "experimenting with" dichotomy).
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ented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biologi-
cal product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily man-
ufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma
technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipu-
lation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the develop-
ment and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biologi-
cal products. 104
Congress adopted this provision in 1984 to overrule the Federal Circuit's
decision in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,105 in which
the court refused to apply the common law experimental use defense.
The § 271(e)(1) safe harbor is part of a balance adopted by Congress that
facilitates bringing generic drugs to market more readily. If generics
were unable to use the patented drug until after the patent had expired to
prepare their FDA applications, there would be a de facto extension of
the patent term during the generic's preparation and approval period.
Allowing generics to use the patented drug to prepare their FDA applica-
tions reduces this delay.
Congress, however, afforded the patentee the ability to sue generics for
merely filing an application (known as an Abbreviated New Drug Appli-
cation, or ANDA) with the FDA.106 Viewed as a technical form of in-
fringement because the drug has yet to be sold or used in a commercial
sense, § 271(e) does provide jurisdiction to federal courts to decide the
infringement and validity issues. 107 To facilitate the ANDA process, pat-
ent holders are required to list all of the patents covering their approved
drugs in what is known as the Orange Book.108 Generic companies can
then consult the Orange Book109 and certify, inter alia, that they do not
infringe the listed patents or that the listed patents are invalid.110 The
104. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2005).
105. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2005).
107. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5) (2005). The scope of the infringement provisions for ANDA
litigation has been hotly contested and has been the source of considerable debate at the
Federal Circuit.
108. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2003).
109. Litigation has erupted over whether the FDA must assure that patentees have cor-
rectly listed patents in the Orange Book and whether a cause of action exists to require the
FDA to remove an inappropriately listed patent. See, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347
F.3d 1335, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2003); aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 238-39 (4th
Cir. 2002) (both finding no cause of action).
110. This is known as a Paragraph IV certification. There are other certifications as
well. As the Federal Circuit has explained:
Reciprocally, a generic company has an obligation to consult the Orange
Book before filing an ANDA and certify that either (I) no patent informa-
tion is listed in the Orange Book for the proposed generic drug; (II) that the
listed patents have expired; (III) that the listed patents will expire before the
generic company markets its product; or (IV) that the patents listed are inva-
lid or will not be infringed by the generic drug (a "paragraph IV certifica-
tion"). 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(I)-(IV).
Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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Orange Book, thus, supplements any public notice function served by
patents, strongly suggesting that patents disclose little to the public; the
Orange Book would not be needed if competitors truly were monitoring
the issuance of patents and patent applications. The competitors are not
learning new things about the technology, but are instead assessing the
scope of the patentee's right to exclude. 11' The disclosure itself does not
seem to be key in teaching the world anything or advancing the state of
the art. Competitors are not likely learning anything new from the patent
itself, but instead already have the ability to enter the market and are just
trying to assess the scope of the patent in order to avoid infringement.
The experimental use defense, thus, is not designed to facilitate innova-
tion, but instead to permit "me too" drugs to promptly enter the market
to compete with the patented drug; hoping to reduce price through
competition.
2. The Risk of Willful Infringement
The doctrine of willful infringement provides another structural infir-
mity to the ability of patents to perform a teaching function. An infringer
who willfully infringes a patent can be subject to treble damages. 1 2 A
prerequisite to willful infringement is actual knowledge of the patent.113
In fact, such knowledge triggers a duty on the part of a potential infringer
to investigate their potential infringement or the validity of the patent."14
A defense to willfulness is often an opinion of counsel that the patent is
not infringed or is invalid."15
Of course, one cannot be a willful infringer if she does not know of the
patent. Given the risk of enhanced damages, a competitor has a signifi-
cant incentive not to review patents at all. Numerous commentators have
recognized this rational ignorance 16 and its serious potential to disrupt
any teaching function purportedly served by the patent system. 117 It is
111. In other words, assessing what the inventor "possesses." See infra notes 119-213
and accompanying text.
112. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2005).
113. Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1090 (2004).
114. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge Gmbh v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). Judge Dyk would have eliminated this duty, in part
due to the fear that it chills the incentive for parties to review issued patents. Id. at 1351-52
(Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. Lemley & Tangri, supra note 113, at 1091-93.
116. See, e.g., id. at 1100-01 ("Once a company becomes aware of a patent, it has an
obligation to obtain a written opinion of counsel or risk later being held a willful infringer.
To avoid this significant cost, in-house patent cotinsel and many outside lawyers regularly
advise their clients not to read patents if there is any way to avoid it. What you do know
will certainly harm you, they reason, so it is generally better not to know." (footnote omit-
ted)); PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 64.
117. Lemley & Tangri, supra note 113, at 1101-02. Recent reform proposals have in-
cluded efforts to mitigate this problem. See H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 6 (2005). The effec-
tiveness of this reform can be questioned, however, because copying the invention "with
knowledge that it was patented" can still result in a finding of willfulness under the pro-
posed act.
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rational for companies to intentionally avoid reviewing published patents
to circumvent the potential costs of the duty to investigate and enhanced
damages. 1 8 Moreover, even if companies are performing searches to en-
sure that their product does not infringe, the patent disclosure itself is not
serving to inform them about the state of the art; the competitor's device
has been created without reference to the patent."l 9 The willfulness doc-
trine, therefore, creates a huge barrier to the effective operation of the
patent system's disclosure function.
3. Eighteen-Month Publication and Provisional Rights
Even absent the willful infringement doctrine, the reality is that disclo-
sures in patents are not timely due to delays in the publication of the
patent and also often due to the patent applicant's delays. 120 Prior to the
adoption of the eighteen-month publication rule, patents were kept confi-
dential until they were issued,12 1 which could be several years. By the
time the patent was issued, the patentee or others likely had already
placed a device on the market, or other publications may have provided
the public with the same information. Thus, the patent disclosure was an
inadequate source of technical information, due to the delay in actually
disclosing the invention.
The adoption of the eighteen-month publication rule mitigated this
concern to some degree. 12 2 Generally, U.S. patent applications are pub-
lished after eighteen months. 123 The information contained in the appli-
cation is thus released to the public in a more timely fashion. Indeed,
because the application and not merely the issued patent is issued, seem-
ingly there will be an even greater wealth of information emerging from
the patent office.124 Superficially, therefore, the publication of applica-
tions appears to enhance the patent's teaching function.
Such faith in early publication may be overstated, however. First, not
all applications are published. The U.S. system allows those applicants
who are only filing in the United States to opt out of the publication
requirement. 125 A recent study suggests that eleven percent of U.S. ap-
plications are not published. 126 Second, even published applications con-
tain dated information. Minimally, the information contained in the
118. Lemley & Tangri, supra note 113, at 1100-01.
119. Disclosure Function, supra note 2, at 2022 ("To the extent that innovators are read-
ing patents only to perform clearance searches for new products, however, the patent sys-
tem is not causing R&D spillovers or reducing duplicative research . .
120. PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2. at 63.
121. See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 669-73 (1969).
122. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2005).
123. Id.
124. Of course, such wealth could reduce the value of the disclosures if the cost to
monitor all of the published applications became inordinately high, which again would
reduce the supposed "teaching" function of patents.
125. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B) (2005).
126. A significant number of applicants take advantage of this option. See PATENT SYS-
TEM, supra note 2, at 64 (noting eleven percent of applications opted out of eighteen-
month publication in 2002).
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patent application is eighteen months old.127 Further compounding this
delay is the one-year grace period of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 128 If an inventor
provides a description of her invention in a printed publication, she has
up to one year to file her patent application. 129 As a result, the informa-
tion disclosed in the patent can be up to two and a half years old relative
to the date the information entered the public domain. The use of provi-
sional applications risks even further aging of the application's disclosure.
A provisional application contains only the written description section of
the patent, and there are no claims.' 30 This application preserves the ap-
plicant's filing date without sacrificing the patent term because the term
does not begin until the applicant converts the provisional application
into a non-provisional application.' 3 ' An applicant has twelve months to
make this conversion.1 32 Thus, if the applicant publishes an article, files a
provisional application one year later, and subsequently files the non-pro-
visional application another year later, then the published patent applica-
tion would contain information that is three and a half years old. Such
aged information would do little to enhance to the storehouse of
knowledge.
Even aside from this practical reason to not consult applications, there
remains a legal disincentive for reviewing published applications. Con-
gress has provided patentees with provisional rights, which afford the pat-
entee compensation for infringements occurring after the publication of
the application but before the issuance of the patent if the patent eventu-
ally issues. 133 A patentee is entitled to a reasonable royalty from anyone
who infringes the claims in the patent application 34 if "the invention as
claimed in the patent is substantially identical to the invention as claimed
in the published patent application.' 35 Liability arises, however, only if
the infringer has actual notice of the patent application. 136 Mere publica-
tion of the application will not constitute constructive notice, as is the
case for the infringement of an issued patent. Rather, the infringer must
actually be aware of the patent application. 137
The knowledge requirement, similar to the situation for willful in-
fringement, creates an additional incentive for rational ignorance. If an
inventor actually does review the published applications for technical in-
formation, she now potentially will be liable to pay a reasonable royalty if
127. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2005).
128. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2005).
129. 36 U.S.C. § 102(3) (2005). The grace period also applies to third party activities.
130. 35 U.S.C. § 111(b)(2) (2005).
131. Id. § 111(b)(5).
132. id.
133. 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (2002).
134. Id. § 154(d)(1).
135. Id. § 154(d)(2). No court has addressed what the term "substantially identical"
means as of this writing.
136. Id. § 154(d)(1)(B). The application must also be published in English if provi-
sional rights are triggered by the publication of an international application. Id.
137. Id.
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she engages in any infringing activity prior to the patent's issuance.' 38 So,
it is wise for her to play ostrich and never actually review the applications
that are being published. Provisional rights therefore serve as an addi-
tional disincentive to look at the published applications, further under-
mining any supposed "teaching" function served by patent disclosures.
4. The Moribund Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents
Further inhibiting the ability of patent disclosure to teach effectively is
the moribund reverse doctrine of equivalents. The reverse doctrine of
equivalents is a defense to literal infringement; although the infringer's
device technically falls within the literal scope of the patent claim, the
doctrine precludes liability if the infringer's device is substantially differ-
ent from that claimed in the patent.139 In essence, if the competitor has
done something vastly different from the patentee, despite what the lit-
eral terms of the patent may say, she will not infringe the patent.
A robust reverse equivalents doctrine could enhance the teaching func-
tion of patents. If a competitor knows that she may escape liability under
the doctrine, she has an incentive to build upon-and beyond-the work
of the patentee. This possibility could create an incentive to review pat-
ents in order to "one up" the inventor, thus creating a true spur to design-
around activity. In fact, because the competitor would not be infringing,
the doctrine could also serve to mitigate the chilling effect of the willful-
ness doctrine. One must actually infringe for there to be enhanced dam-
ages, so the safe harbor that the reverse doctrine of equivalents could
provide would help mitigate the risks associated with reviewing patent
disclosures.
The reverse doctrine of equivalents, however, is effectively dead.
While the doctrine has found many fans in the academy, 140 the courts,
particularly the Federal Circuit, have not been receptive to it. The Fed-
eral Circuit has yet to affirm a judgment of non-infringement on this ba-
sis. 14 1 The court instead seems to view the doctrine as essentially dead,
despite its origins in Supreme Court case law. 142 Without this potential
safety valve, there is even less reason for a competitor to review patents.
138. Id.
139. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950).
140. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 29, 32 (2005); Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 49, at 1010-
13; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 860-68 (1990).
141. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
142. Id. ("Even were this court likely ever to affirm a defense to literal infringement
based on the reverse doctrine of equivalents, the presence of one anachronistic exception,
long mentioned but rarely applied, is hardly reason to create another."); see Burk & Lem-
ley, supra note 49, at 1657 ("The doctrine is rarely applied, and a recent Federal Circuit
decision casts its future in doubt.").
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D. PATENTS: INEFFECTUAL TEACHERS
The courts remain enamored with the quid pro quo view of the patent
system, and the disclosure obligations are the central tenets of this princi-
ple. Not only are the disclosure obligations inconsistent with the theoret-
ical justifications of patent law, but the current structure of the patent
system undermines the ability of patents to actually perform this function.
This is not to say that patents do not play any teaching function whatso-
ever. In some technological fields, it could be that people consult the
patent document to learn new things, although the above analysis
strongly suggests such review to be highly unlikely. Patents can provide a
sort of feedback loop to encourage teachings via pre-patent disclosures
and publications. An inventor who anticipates obtaining a patent on an
invention will be more willing to publish a scientific article or other sort
of disclosure to the public, because she knows her invention will eventu-
ally be protected by a patent and not by a trade secret. The pre-patent
disclosure will not cost the inventor anything because the subsequent pat-
ent will provide protection. Of course, this feedback loop further sup-
ports the conclusion that the disclosure in the patent itself is not terribly
relevant to enhancing the storehouse of knowledge, because the inventor
would have disclosed the information in a medium other than the patent
itself.
Thus, while stating that patents never serve a teaching function is too
strong of a statement, the courts have grossly overstated the true extent
of this function. Given the teaching function's inconsistency and irrele-
vance to patent theory, basing patent policy and doctrine on the quid pro
quo, as the courts do, is a flawed approach. The courts should retreat
somewhat from their reliance on the teaching function of patents as justi-
fying their conclusions.
IV. ENABLEMENT AS "POSSESSION" IN
CURRENT PATENT LAW
The practical and theoretical infirmity of this teaching function begs
the question, however, of why we maintain the disclosure obligations in
patent law. Both the prospect and incentive theories recognize the im-
portance of the patent's exclusive rights, which are a form of a property
right. An important concept in property generally is that of possession,
which serves to demarcate that which is yours and that which is someone
else's. In the case of patent law, the "thing" possessed, however, is intan-
gible. The invention is not necessarily a particular embodiment necessa-
rily but more the idea of the invention. Possession of this inchoate idea
must be demonstrated somehow, and the disclosure obligations serve this
function. The disclosure obligation communicates to the world exactly
what the innovator has created.
Of course, demonstrating the possession of an intangible idea is diffi-
cult. One could describe an idea but not necessarily truly be in posses-
sion of it. For example, the idea of teleportation has existed in science
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fiction, such as in Star Trek, for some time. Simply having the idea of
teleportation, however, does not mean that those authors are in posses-
sion of a teleportation device. Instead, the key aspect of possession is
whether or not the author can actually make a functioning device. Thus,
the best evidence of possession would be either the inventor physically
creating the invention or, at least, providing a description that is clear
enough to enable someone else to build it.143 In other words, the best
way to demonstrate possession is to provide an enabling disclosure, as
required under paragraph one of 112.144
Enablement performs the role of demonstrating what the inventor pos-
sessed as her invention when filing her application. Thinking of enable-
ment as demonstrating possession, as opposed to providing an
informative disclosure, has significant descriptive and normative potential
in patent law which has previously been unrecognized. This section will
explore the present, explicit uses of enablement and explain them
through the "possession" paradigm, in contrast to the "teaching" view.
This shift has significant descriptive power, explaining much of current
patent law doctrine. It also has considerable prescriptive force, sug-
gesting ways to modify existing law to embrace the centrality of posses-
sion to patent law and enablement's essential role in demonstrating
possession.
A. VIEWING ENABLEMENT AS SHOWING POSSESSION OF AN
INVENTION PROVIDES A BETTER THEORETICAL FIT
Considering enabling disclosures as demonstrating possession of the in-
vention helps explain why we continue to require disclosure of inventions
despite the apparent inconsistency with patent theory. Showing posses-
sion of an invention is an important aspect of the incentive, prospect, and
portfolio theories.
1. The Role of Possession in Incentive Theory
The incentive theory is premised on the idea that an inventor can
recoup her sunk research and development costs by being granted the
right to exclude others from using her invention. Of course, to effectuate
this function, both the inventor and the public must know the scope of
the right to exclude. The right should generally be commensurate with
what the inventor actually invented or possessed. Otherwise the patentee
would receive an unjustified windfall and, through the exclusive rights,
this could inhibit further innovation in his technical field.
Enablement as a test for possession is consistent with this aspect of
incentive theory. It can play an important role in communicating to com-
petitors the scope of the rights to exclude. If considerable uncertainty
attends the patent, then third parties are unable ex ante to assess what




constitutes the patentee's territory.145 Those parties may waste resources
in duplicative and infringing efforts.
Alternatively, competitors can effectively design around the patent ef-
fectively if the scope is known. Designing around, however, actually is
derivative of possession; it does not depend on any teaching function of
the patent itself. It instead is premised on certainty surrounding the pat-
ent rights. A competitor knows what the inventor possesses via the pat-
ent and will try to create something that the inventor did not possess.
There is no denying that this may create incremental and follow-on inno-
vation, but the driving force is the scope of the patent right and not the
teaching of the patent. 146 The technology necessary to design around, for
the aforementioned reasons, is likely already within the public domain.
Instead, the disclosure of what the inventor possessed provides guidance
to competitors on how to avoid the patent.
Public notice, of course, presumes that third parties are actually read-
ing patents, when there is a strong reason to believe they are not. The
ability of patents to serve their public notice function is undermined by
current patent law. Thus, calls to alter issues such as willful infringement
are well-rooted, not only in terms of enhancing the teaching function of
patents but also in terms of encouraging reliance on patents in assessing
the scope of the right to exclude. 147
2. Prospect Theory and Possession
The role of enablement in demonstrating possession is also important
in the prospect theory for reasons similar to the incentive theory, al-
though the implications vary significantly. Prospect theory holds that
broad patents should be granted early in the development process to al-
low the inventor to coordinate later developments, avoiding wasteful du-
plicative efforts. Unlike the incentive theory, which would consider
design-around efforts helpful, the prospect theory views the patent holder
to be in the best position to control and develop downstream improve-
ments. Design-around should not be encouraged. While this contention
is debatable, 148 the need for clarity as to the scope of the prospect right is
essential. If the patent is supposed to act as a significant "keep out" sign,
then the rights must be clear. Enablement as demonstrating possession
again can serve this role by delineating the appropriate scope of the
patent.
The prospect theory, though, takes a broader view of the right to ex-
clude than the incentive theory. If a patentee is meant to coordinate
downstream improvements on her technology, then seemingly the patent
145. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 468
(2004).
146. Id.
147. Of course, a patentee can always provide actual notice to competitors by notifying
them of the patent believed to be infringed.
148. See generally Lemley, Justifications, supra note 47. The existence of blocking pat-
ents belies the prospect theory's view of the patent system.
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scope should be interpreted broadly and likely should include prophetic
or even equivalent improvements. As the recent case law regarding the
doctrine of equivalents makes clear, such an expansive scope creates con-
siderable uncertainty. Enablement may provide a method of demonstrat-
ing not only possession but also the breadth of that possession, thereby
allowing competitors to know what is within the scope of the prospect. 149
3. Signaling and Portfolio Theory
Signaling theory is also more consistent with viewing enablement as a
measurement of possession, as opposed to a mechanism for advancing the
state of the art. The patent is to act as a signal to the market, not to
technologists. What the market wants to know is whether the firm has
something of value or is innovative. At the root, then, of signaling theory
is an attempt by the firm to disclose what it possesses through low cost
mechanisms so that investors will commit financial resources. The patent
may also signal the direction the firm intends to follow, but the signal's
audience is actually concerned with the patent's potential reward in terms
of return rather than with that disclosure's technical details. The market
wants to know what the firm possesses; it does not want to learn from or
improve upon what the firm has created. The use of an enabling disclo-
sure to demonstrate possession is thus entirely consistent with and sup-
portive of signaling theory.
Enablement's role in demonstrating possession of the invention is also
consistent with portfolio theory, although, with its focus on the quantity
of patents and not the content of individual patents, portfolio theory does
not seem concerned with the extent of the disclosure. At some level, the
disclosure is important even in portfolio theory in order for the collection
of patents to serve its "superpatent" status; competitors and infringers
must have some ability to assess the scope of the portfolio's exclusive
rights. This is more appropriately a view of disclosure as possession-
what the company has invented collectively as demonstrated by the pat-
ents in the portfolio. Given the focus on numbers in portfolio theory, the
incentive to obtain many patents could even further undermine any al-
leged teaching function, because the wave of patents would seem to make
the actual use of the patent disclosure as an educational source rather
problematic due to higher search costs. Consequently, embracing a pos-
session-based view of disclosure, and particularly of enablement, is more
consistent with the signaling and portfolio theories.
4. Possession as Facilitating Public Notice, the Federal Circuit's
Favorite Mantra
The centrality of possession in patent theory explains why patent sys-
tems around the world continue to maintain disclosure obligations and




particularly explains the requirement for an enabling description of the
invention. In all of the theories of patent law, the possession view helps
provide needed public notice to third parties. This theoretical justifica-
tion finds fruition in recent Federal Circuit jurisprudence, which has come
to emphasize the public notice function that patents serve.15 0 The Fed-
eral Circuit views patents as providing notice to the public of the scope of
the inventor's right to exclude.151
Public notice has nothing to do with what the patent would "teach" the
world in terms of education. Instead, it relates to the role of the patent in
providing the "fence" that demarks the patentee's right to exclude and
does not relate to the information the patentee has disclosed to further
innovation. Although the court treats public notice and the teaching
function as the same, there are in fact subtle differences. Teaching as-
sumes that the patent discloses new information into the public domain to
inform others. The public notice function of the patent system does not
require that the disclosed information be new in any sense; the informa-
tion may have been independently created or discerned from sources
other than the patent. Public notice, instead, is concerned with the extent
of the right to exclude, which should be commensurate with what the
inventor has actually invented and had in her possession at the time of
the application. The public's interest is not so much about learning some-
thing new as it is about assessing the scope of the inventor's right to ex-
clude in order to safely navigate the technological waters. The Federal
Circuit's emphasis on public notice is consistent with the view that disclo-
sure is mostly concerned with demonstrating possession of the invention.
B. ENABLEMENT AS DEMONSTRATING POSSESSION IN CURRENT LAW
The idea of enablement demonstrating possession of the invention is
not in and of itself a new concept. It is present in certain areas of patent
law, such as anticipation and claim construction. Even in these recog-
nized areas, however, the courts and commentators have failed to realize
the full robustness of possession's centrality to patent law.
1. Enablement as Possession in Anticipation
Patents are only granted for inventions that are not already known in
the prior art. If an invention is not novel, then it is anticipated by the
prior art. Anticipation is a strict standard because the invention as pre-
cisely claimed must have existed identically in the prior art to be antici-
pated.152 Anticipation can occur if the invention has been physically
created prior to the patent applicant's creation or if it has been described
150. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); In
re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1330, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
151. Wallach, 378 F.3d at 1334.
152. The traditional forms of prior art references are printed publications or issued pat-
ents, both in the United States and abroad. Other forms of prior art are patents that have
been abandoned to the public, 35 U.S.C. § 102(c), patent applications which eventually
issue or which the PTO publishes, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), derivation of the invention from a
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in a qualifying printed form. In other words, if the prior art places the
PHOSITA in possession of the claimed invention through a physical em-
bodiment or a written disclosure, then it anticipates that invention.
Again, possession is central to anticipation law, and enablement is partic-
ularly essential to making this determination.
Section 102 of the Patent Act defines what constitutes a prior art refer-
ence.1 53 Presently, however, § 102 is a jumbled mess of various rules that
prescribe the conditions necessary for an activity or publication to qualify
as prior art.154 The various provisions in § 102 differ in the timing of
events that trigger the date when a publication or activity serves as a prior
art reference. 155 Some activities are prior art if they occur before the
date that the inventor created the invention, which reflects the United
States' first-to-invent approach to determine who is entitled to a pat-
ent. 156 Other acts or publications qualify as prior art if they occur at a
date one year prior to the inventor filing her application, regardless of
when she created her invention. 157 These prior art provisions act as a bar
to the patent because they preclude obtaining a patent even if the inven-
tor in fact created the invention first.
By concentrating on the central role that possession has in anticipation,
§ 102 becomes somewhat clearer. Moreover, this viewpoint creates a
more theoretically and practically accessible basis for assessing § 102,
which could serve as a basis to simplify this complex and perplexing pro-
vision. The subsections of § 102 can be functionally categorized by distin-
guishing activities of third parties from those of the inventor. Third-party
activities that place the public in possession of the invention will antici-
pate the invention. Inventor activities that either demonstrate that the
inventor herself has placed the public in possession of the invention or
show an inappropriate delay on the part of the inventor to file her patent
application may render the inventor's application anticipated. The fol-
lowing subsection explores this dichotomy as it relates to possession and
enablement.
a. Third-Party Activities Placing the Public in Possession of the
Invention
Third parties can place the invention into the public's possession by
actually building the device or disclosing the device in some way that al-
lows others to make it. This latter form is the enablement doctrine serv-
ing to show the public's possession of the inchoate idea of the
previous inventor, 35 U.S.C. § 102(f), or evidence of a prior invention by another party, 35
U.S.C. § 102(g).
153. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2005).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. § 102(a).
157. Id. § 102(b).
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invention.158 The following section explores these two categories of prior
art: possession by physically reducing the invention to practice and pos-
session by providing an enabling description. The law in this context is
not concerned with whether the prior art actually taught something to this
particular inventor or to the public more broadly, but is instead con-
cerned with whether, objectively without reference to any particular ap-
plicant, the invention was already in the public domain. Enablement in
this context is important solely to prove that the public possessed the
invention prior to the patentee. 159
Various parts of § 102 catalog the third-party activities that serve as
prior art. Some of these forms of prior art involve the third party placing
the public in actual possession of the invention because the party has cre-
ated a physical embodiment of it.16O In contrast, other parts of § 102 pre-
scribe as prior art third-party activity that places the public in possession
of the invention through an enabling public disclosure of the invention.1 61
These provisions vary as to their timing, however. Some are tied to the
applicant's invention date, reflecting the United States's first-to-invent
system; the relevant third-party acts must have occurred prior to the date
that the patent applicant invented the relevant device or method.1 62 For
others, the relevant triggering date is the critical date, which is the date
one year prior to the patent application date.163 If third parties are pub-
licly in possession of the invention prior to the critical date, regardless of
whether the patent applicant invented first, then the patent is invalid.
These statutory bars are exceptions to the first-to-invent system because
the applicant may be precluded from obtaining a patent even if she was
the first to invent the device.
An applicant therefore can be denied a patent if the public was in ac-
tual possession of the claimed invention before either the applicant's date
of invention or the critical date due to third-party activities. Section
102(a) prescribes that a patent cannot issue if the invention was "known
or used by others" in the United States before the invention date of the
relevant applicant.1 64 Similarly, § 102(b) bars a patent if the claimed in-
vention was in public use in the United States more than one year before
the filing date of the patent application. 165 To be "in use" or to be
"known or used," someone must have physically constructed an embodi-
ment of the invention. To qualify as prior art, however, this demonstra-
tion of actual, physical possession of the invention by third parties must
158. See, e.g., Elan Pharm., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research, 346 F.3d
1051. 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
159. Id. at 1055.
160. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b).
161. Id.
162. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (e), (f), & (g).
163. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 57-58 (1998).
164. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
165. Id. § 102(b).
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be accessible to the relevant public.166
These provisions also provide for the demonstration of possession by
the public if the third party discloses an enabling description of the inven-
tion. Printed publications and patents are § 102(a) references if they are
published before the date of invention. Section 102(e) creates prior art
for issued patents or published applications where a third party has filed
her application before the inventor's date of invention. 167 Section 102(f)
prescribes that an inventor cannot in essence steal the invention from
someone else, but to count as "theft," the communication from the third-
party to the inventor must enable the creation of the invention. 168 In con-
trast to these first-to-invent provisions, § 102(b) references are any
printed publications, issued patents, or issued patent applications that are
published more than one year before the date of the inventor's applica-
tion for the patent. 169 All of these provisions preclude patentability when
the prior art demonstrates that the public was in possession of the inven-
tion pursuant to an enabling disclosure.' 70
Section 102(b) contains another provision that again emphasizes en-
ablement's essential role in demonstrating possession. If third parties
have offered to sell the invention in the United States more than one year
before the application date, then the applicant cannot obtain a patent.' 71
In order for an invention to be on sale, it must be the subject of a formal
commercial offer for sale,172 and the invention must be ready for patent-
ing.173 An invention is "ready for patenting" if the creator has actually
made the invention, called a "reduction to practice" in patent parlance, or
if there are diagrams that would allow one of ordinary skill in the art to
make the invention.174 I have previously argued, and the Federal Circuit
166. See, e.g., In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Reform propos-
als suggest codifying the accessibility requirement. See H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
167. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). The reasoning for treating the application as prior art effec-
tively on the date the application is filed, and not when it is published, is that delays at the
PTO should not justify allowing two patents on the same invention to issue. Theoretically
and ideally, the application could mature into a patent instantly. Realistically, the review
process takes time, and notwithstanding that another inventor could create the invention
while the application is kept confidential, that administrative delay should not entitle the
later inventor to a patent. See Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S.
390, 400-01 (1926).
168. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(f); Int'l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363,
1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
169. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
170. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1342-43
(2005).
171. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
172. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1255-56 (Fed. Cir. 2000). But
see Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the "Threat of a Sale": Assessing Patent Infringe-
ment for Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Bar to Patentability
and Other Forms ofInfringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 800 (2003) [hereinafter
Holbrook, Threat of Sale] (arguing for a standard based on "commercialization" rather
than a formal commercial offer).
173. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1998). Although Pfaff dealt with the
situation where the inventor made the commercial offer to sell the invention, §102(b) also




subsequently agreed, that this latter standard is essentially the enable-
ment standard of § 112.175 Again, enablement is serving to demonstrate
whether the third party was in possession of the invention when she made
the offer to sell. The Supreme Court made it clear that this possession
can be demonstrated without a physical embodiment. 176
The last provision in § 102(g) further evinces enablement's crucial role
in establishing the possession of the invention by the public. Section
102(g) generally governs priority contests that determine who should be
awarded the patent among competing applicants for patents covering the
same device. 177 Section 102(g)(1) is limited solely to interferences, the
administrative proceedings at the PTO by which the PTO determines
which of the inventors will be awarded the patent. 178 It expressly does
not serve as a source of prior art.179
Section 102(g)(2), in contrast, can be a source of prior art; if a third
party created the invention before the applicant without abandoning,
suppressing, or concealing it, then the applicant cannot obtain a patent.180
Central to assessing who is the "first to invent" is establishing on what
dates the parties conceived of the invention. Generally, the first to con-
ceive is viewed as the first to invent. 18 1 Conception is a term of art that
requires the inventor to demonstrate that she had the mental idea of the
complete invention as claimed in the patent. 182 In order to prove concep-
tion, the evidence must demonstrate a communication of the idea in a
way such "that one skilled in the art could understand the invention."'1 83
In other words, there must be evidence of an enabling description of the
mental idea in order to demonstrate that the applicant possessed the
invention.' 84
The provisions of § 102 relating to third-party activities essentially de-
lineate circumstances when the public is in possession of the invention by
a physical or descriptive disclosure of the invention. At no point is the
law concerned with whether the inventor subjectively learned anything
175. See Holbrook, More Things Change, supra note 9, at 967-74 (arguing that the en-
ablement standard of § 112, T 1 should be used for the on-sale bar analysis); see also Janis,
supra note 6, at 71 ("For example, assessing 'possession' by way of the Pfaffstandard ap-
pears to call explicitly for an enablement analysis."). The Federal Circuit has embraced
this approach. See Space Sys./Loral, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 271 F.3d 1076, 1080
(Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[Wjhen development and verification are needed in order to prepare a
patent application that complies with § 112, the invention is not yet ready for patenting.").
176. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 66.
177. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2005).
178. Id. § 102(g)(1).
179. See id. (expressly only applying "during the course of an interference").
180. Id. § 102(g)(2).
181. The "first to invent" is the first to conceive who either is first to reduce to practice
or who is diligent in reducing the invention to practice, even if she does so after someone
else does. Id.
182. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc. 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
183. Id.
184. See Field v. Knowles, 183 F.2d 593, 600-01 (C.C.P.A. 1950). The inventor need not
know whether his idea will actually work, however; thus, the conception need not demon-
strate the utility of the invention. Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d at 1228.
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new from the prior art; indeed, the inventor's actual awareness of the
prior art is utterly irrelevant to assessing the novelty of the invention.
Section 102 confirms that enablement's primary function is not to teach
or inform the public, but instead to prove possession.
b. Activities by the Applicant Constituting Prior Art
Section 102 also governs activities by the patent applicant that show
she has allowed the public to come into possession of the invention. The
obligations on applicants, however, are more stringent; she can lose the
right to the invention even if she has not placed the public in possession
of the invention.185 Enablement still has a role to play in these preclusion
contexts as well, even though these provisions may depart from the tradi-
tional view of prior art as demonstrating what was in the public domain.
Many third-party acts that serve to anticipate a claimed invention also
anticipate if performed by the applicant. There are some acts by patent
applicants, however, that would not invalidate a patent claim if done by a
third party. This difference is seen significantly in the public use and on-
sale bars of § 102(b). 186 If uses by a third party are secret, that use will
not bar or invalidate the patent. In contrast, secret uses of inventions by
the applicant may anticipate the invention.1 87 Although this disparate re-
sult may seem odd, precluding patents for applicants who have secretly
used the invention serves other policy considerations, such as encourag-
ing the applicant to file promptly at the PTO and preventing the applicant
from appropriating the benefits of her invention beyond the patent
term.' 88 We want to encourage inventors to act in timely and appropriate
ways, and the potential loss of the patent right is the spur to induce the
inventor's behavior.189 These policy concerns are not at issue for third
parties who have not availed themselves of the patent system. With third
parties, the only concern is whether the public is in possession of the
invention.
Even with secret uses constituting invalidating acts, central to the anal-
ysis is a demonstration, through an enabling disclosure, that the applicant
was in possession of the invention. To trigger the on-sale bar or the pub-
lic use bar, the invention must still be ready for patenting; the inventor
must be in actual or constructive possession of the invention. 190 It is at
this point that the triggers are viewed as appropriate to subject the inven-
tor to the possible pernicious consequences of failing to timely file an
application.
185. Necessarily some of § 102's provisions only apply to third-party activities. If the
provision is keyed to the date of invention, then it would be impossible for the inventor to
disclose the invention to the public before she has actually created it. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (only acts "by others" constitute prior art).
186. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
187. See Invitrogen Corp. v. Brocrest Mfg., 424 F.3d 1374, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
188. See Holbrook, More Things Change, supra note 9, at 943 (discussing policies un-
derlying on-sale and public use bars).
189. Id. at 943-44.
190. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1998).
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Section 102 contains other consequences that attend acts or omissions
by the applicant that implicate enablement as a form of showing posses-
sion. Section 102(f) clarifies that an applicant cannot obtain a patent if
she has taken the idea from a third party, regardless of whether that com-
munication is public in nature. 191 Thus, confidential, non-public commu-
nications can anticipate the applicant's claims. The communication
between the applicant and the third party, however, must demonstrate
that the third party, and not the applicant, was the first to possess the
invention. To prove this fact, the third party's communication to the ap-
plicant must enable the practice of the invention. 192 This use of the en-
ablement doctrine is, in one sense, "teaching": the applicant has learned
of the invention from someone else. The knowledge may not be gener-
ally accessible to the public. 193 The actual concern, however, is that the
applicant is not truly the first to possess the invention, in derogation of
the first-to-invent system of the United States. The requirement of an
enabling communication demonstrates that the third party was the first to
possess the invention and not the applicant. 194
Consequently, the provisions of § 102 that relate to acts by the patent
applicant are also primarily concerned with demonstrating possession, ei-
ther by the inventor in a manner that suggests she should be precluded
from obtaining the patent or by third parties from whom the applicant
has inappropriately taken the invention. Enablement in all of these con-
texts is used to demonstrate this possession.
c. Possibilities for Reform
The above analysis suggests some possible ways that the use of enable-
ment as possession could greatly simplify the law of anticipation. The key
question is whether the public or the inventor is in possession of the in-
vention, which is demonstrated by a physical embodiment or an enabling
description of the invention prior to the relevant priority date: the critical
date or the invention date. The proper dichotomy, in lieu of the confus-
ing structure of § 102, is to bifurcate activities by third parties, where
there must be some level of public accessibility, from those of the inven-
191. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f).
192. See, e.g., Int'l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
193. Indeed, if it was accessible to the public, likely the communication would qualify
under one of the other provisions of § 102.
194. Under this analysis, § 102(c) and (d), dealing with abandonment of inventions and
delays in filing applications in the United States, are a bit anomalous. In my view, they are
also irrelevant and could be deleted from the patent act. Abandonment rarely, if ever,
happens, and such an act likely is covered by other prior art provisions. Problems created
by delays in filing applications in the United States after filing abroad have been mitigated
by the priority provisions of the Paris Convention and the Patent Cooperation Treaty.
These international agreements have eviscerated the usefulness of § 102(d). Recent re-
form legislation also seems to agree with this perspective by calling for the elimination of
these provisions. See The Patent Act of 2005, H.R. 2795 109th Cong. (2005); see also
Wendy H. Schacht & John R. Thomas, CRS Report for Congress, Patent Reform: Innova-
tion Issues, at 18-20 (July 15, 2005), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/RL
32996.pdf (last visited July 22, 2005).
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tor, whose own secret activities will preclude patent protection because
she has failed to timely file an application. Priority for third party activi-
ties would be the date the activity became public through publication of
an article, a public use, or an attempt to commercialize the invention,
keyed to either the applicant's invention date or the critical date. For
issued patents or published patent applications, the relevant date for pri-
ority purposes would be the application date, akin to § 102(e). 195
Recent proposals to amend § 102 comport favorably with this refined
view of the prior art. The proposed act emphasizes the role of enable-
ment and bifurcates acts by the inventor and third parties. For example,
pending legislation would alter the grace period under § 102(b) depend-
ing upon if it is the acts of the applicant, thus receiving a grace period, or
third parties, thus providing no grace period.196 Moreover, the reform
efforts streamline the prior art provisions in lieu of the ad hoc statutory
scheme presently in existence. The Reform Act's proposals, therefore,
take the broader, possession view of the prior art instead of myopically
focusing on statutory technicalities. The above analysis provides support
for these reform efforts because § 102 is essentially designed to discern
whether the public or the inventor possessed the invention prior to the
relevant triggering date.
2. Enablement as a Constraint on the Scope of Patent Claims
The role of possession is not only relevant to ascertaining the novelty
of a patent claim, it is also important in assessing the scope of those
claims. A patent should not cover more than what the inventor possessed
in an objective sense. His patent reward should be commensurate with
the scope of his innovation. Otherwise, the patentee would be unduly
rewarded for his invention through the granting of broad patent rights
and might preclude others from reaping the benefit of subsequent
innovations.
Enablement doctrine performs this role of confining the scope of the
claims to what the inventor actually possessed. Naturally, a claim that is
not enabled is invalid, but enablement also independently constrains the
scope of the claim as a matter of claim construction.' 97 The patentee is
entitled to a scope which is commensurate only with her disclosure. This
limit on the scope is particularly important in unpredictable art fields.
For example, if a patentee discovers a cure for ovarian cancer, she likely
will not be able to claim curing all forms of cancer.' 98 She can only claim
195. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
196. See Patent Act of 2005, H.R. 2795 109th Cong. (2005); see also Schacht & Thomas,
supra note 194, at 17.
197. Cf. Robin Feldman, The Inventor's Contribution, 2005 UCLA J. OF LAW & TECH-
NOLOGY 6, 55-56 (distinguishing "did the inventor society give enough" as a validity
question and "how much should the inventor receive" as a scope issue).
198. Cf. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1562-64 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (rejecting as unenabled
claims for a vaccine to all RNA viruses, including the HIV virus, but allowing claims di-
rected to a specific working example).
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that which the PHOSITA objectively recognized would be in the inven-
tor's possession. 199
Some accommodation is made in claim scope for prophetic embodi-
ments, which are forms of the invention that the patentee did not actually
invent but which would be within the scope of her disclosure. In other
words, the PHOSITA, reading the patent, would know that the inventor
was in constructive possession of those embodiments, although she never
actually possessed them. This doctrine reduces the need for the patentee
to disclose every potential variation of the invention if those variations
would be within the grasp of one of ordinary skill of the art, as measured
by the enablement standard. To require disclosure of every variant would
be extremely costly and burdensome to both the applicant and the PTO.
These prophetic examples cannot allow the patent claim to extend be-
yond what the inventor possessed. Undue patent scope could have a chil-
ling affect on others who may actually be investigating how to create the
prophetically claimed invention when the inventor herself may not be
able to do so, or to further develop the patentee's invention.200 Enable-
ment provides the standard for balancing these competing interests. 20 1
Claim construction would thus be directly limited by enablement. In
order to literally infringe the patent, the patent would have to enable the
accused device, thus showing that the patentee had placed the PHOSITA
in possession of it. This could be viewed as a part of claim construction:
the literal scope of the patent is limited to what is enabled.20 2 For non-
enabled embodiments, the patentee would have to resort to the doctrine
of equivalents.
A strict application of this possession principle may lead to a narrower
claim scope, which may allow competitors to more easily design around
the claim, reducing ex ante incentives to innovate.20 3 Consequently, such
199. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 49, at 1593-94 ("Patent scope is necessarily interre-
lated with obviousness and enablement.... [P]atent claims are invalid if they are not fully
described and enabled by the patent specification, so the permissible breadth of a patent
will be determined by how much information the court determines must be disclosed to
enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the patented invention."). The
scope of what she possesses is discerned objectively, so what the inventor thinks her inven-
tion is has little bearing on the issue.
200. See, e.g., Jordan Paradise, Lori Andrews, & Tim Holbrook, Patents on Human
Genes: an Analysis of Scope and Claims, 307 Sci. 1566, 1566-67 (Mar. 11, 2005) (discussing
chilling effect for overly broad patents on human genes).
201. Cf. Burk & Lemley, supra note 49, at 1683 (advocating recalibration of enable-
ment to permit broader claiming).
202. This approach can be seen in a recent concurring opinion. See Chiron Corp. v.
Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Bryson, J., concurring) (adopting
this approach and noting that it "preserves the benefits of patent protection for the inven-
tion that the applicant has actually conceived and enabled, without extending those bene-
fits for an invention that the applicant may not have conceived and certainly has not
enabled.").
203. Professor Feldman has advocated two scenarios relevant to claim scope-where
the patentee has failed to disclose information that could have been known and informa-
tion that could not have been known at the time of the application. See Feldman, supra
note 197, at 45. The former would be evaluated through enablement to, in essence, show
possession, while the latter would be unavailable seemingly even under the doctrine of
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a shift could place more pressure on the doctrine of equivalents to pro-
vide adequate patent protection. Under the doctrine of equivalents, a
device accused of infringing can infringe a patent even if the patent claim
does not literally cover that device, so long as the differences between the
invention as claimed and the accused device are insubstantial. 20 4 The
court views the doctrine of equivalents to have its greatest role in the
situation where later-developed technology has altered the importance of
the patent claim. 20 5 In terms of possession, the court paradoxically allows
a patentee to cover an asserted equivalent only when she was not in pos-
session of that embodiment at the time she filed her patent application.20 6
The courts have criticized the doctrine of equivalents because it could
undermine the certainty surrounding a patent claim. 20 7 The Federal Cir-
cuit has sought to contain the doctrine through a variety of legal limita-
tions that have significantly reduced the effective claim scope.20 8 Unlike
the court, I am confident that the doctrine can play an effective and im-
portant role in guaranteeing adequate protection and compensation to
ensure that the patent incentive is not undermined by unduly narrow pat-
ents. 20 9 The doctrine can play an important safety-valve function to en-
sure the proper function of the patent system by allowing protection for
insubstantially different inventions, which in essence steal the innovated
idea while avoiding the technical and admittedly imprecise language of
the claim. As such, the ex ante to innovate is preserved by the potential
for coverage under the doctrine of equivalents. Even if this potential is
slight, resulting in significant discounting of added value to the patent, the
equivalents. I do not subscribe to this absolute preclusion and believe the doctrine of
equivalents can provide a safety valve to protect the patent incentive, particularly where
changes without a given technology alter the landscape of that technology. See infra note
209.
204. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1997). The
doctrine must be applied on an element-by-element basis. Id.; see also Timothy R. Hol-
brook, Substantive v. Process-Based Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 123, 129-30 (2005) [hereinafter Holbrook, Claim Construction.
205. See, e.g., Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d
1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The doctrine of equivalents is necessary because one cannot
predict the future. Due to technological advances, a variant of an invention may be devel-
oped after the patent is granted, and that variant may constitute so insubstantial a change
from what is claimed in the patent that it should be held to be an infringement. Such a
variant, based on after-developed technology, could not have been disclosed in the
patent.").
206. Id. at 1311.
207. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28-29 (expressing "concern... that the doctrine of
equivalents ... has taken on a life of its own, unbounded by the patent claims").
208. See infra notes 235-60 and accompanying text (explaining how the limitations on
the doctrine are effectively evaluating whether the asserted equivalent was in the posses-
sion of one of ordinary skill in the art).
209. One way to maintain the doctrine of equivalents without unduly undermining cer-
tainty would be to limit the doctrine to situations where technological change outside the
field of the relevant patent has altered the significance of the particular claim. For in-
stance, in Hughes Aircraft v. United States, it was the advent of computer technology, and
nothing within satellite control technology that impacted the relevant invention, making




availability of the doctrine still enhances the value of the patent and thus
maintains innovation incentives. The added costs of uncertainty to me
are outweighed by the systemic value of encouraging innovation, particu-
larly in light of the fact that so few patents are litigated.
The Federal Circuit's precedent increasingly uses the specification to
limit claim scope to accord to what the inventor objectively possessed.
The court may have overstepped its bounds, however, in this regard. The
court has come to treat disclosures in the specification in an estoppel-like
way, holding any representation made by the patentee against her, re-
gardless of whether the PHOSITA would interpret the patent in such a
narrow fashion. 210 The court is placing primacy on the disclosure, and
not on what the PHOSITA would think. The court is therefore con-
cerned with reigning in the claim scope, based on the disclosure, to show
what the inventor possesses and not what the patent teaches. The court's
approach, however, is not truly objective; it is not properly viewed from
the perspective of the PHOSITA but instead from an almost subjective
viewpoint of what the inventor considered the invention to be.
The court has failed to draw the appropriate balance in its reliance on
the specification. 211 By excluding consideration of the PHOSITA
through the use of estoppel-like principles, the court has shifted the pat-
ent from being a technical document to a legal one, where representa-
tions made in the specification have significant legal consequences
regardless of how a technologist would read them. While demonstrating
the important role that possession-and thus enablement-plays in claim
construction, the court has strayed too far down this road by adopting
seemingly subjective, estoppel-like claim construction methodologies. A
return to the use of the enablement doctrine would more properly bal-
ance the interest in keeping patent applications rather concise but
preventing applicants from claiming far beyond what they have actually
invented.
V. REFRAMING OTHER DOCTRINES IN LIGHT OF
ENABLEMENT AS "POSSESSION"
The pervasiveness of enablement as demonstrating the possession of an
invention is apparent in anticipation and claim scope. The law openly
embraces enablement in these areas, although this role could be refined
and enhanced in certain aspects. The importance of possession, however,
is not limited to these circumstances. Consideration of other areas of pat-
ent law demonstrates the potential for an even greater role for posses-
sion, as demonstrated by an enabling disclosure. This section evaluates
this potential expansion, which can afford the opportunity to reduce the
210. See Holbrook, Claim Construction, supra note 204, at 142-43 (discussing "specifica-
tion estoppel").
211. See id. at 143-44, 150-51 (criticizing this approach and articulating a rebuttable
presumption methodology for claim construction).
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complexity of patent law and bring greater theoretical and doctrinal sym-
metry to the law.
A. WRITTEN DESCRIPrION DOCTRINE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO ITS
PRIORITY POLICING FUNCTION
Section 112 of the Patent Act requires the patent application to contain
both a written description and an enabling disclosure of the invention.212
The test for assessing the written description requirement is whether the
inventor was in possession of the invention at the time she filed her appli-
cation,213 which would seem duplicative of the proposed use of enable-
ment to demonstrate possession. Evaluation of the Federal Circuit's
current written description jurisprudence, particularly that jurisprudence
extending the requirement to originally filed claims, demonstrates that
enablement, and not written description, is the correct manner to assess
possession. The written description doctrine should be relegated to its
previous role of preventing the addition of new matter to the patent
application.
Although the origins of the written description requirement are fairly
murky, it is likely a historical vestige of the early patent system that did
not use claims. 214 Before claims, the only way to define the scope of the
invention was to require a description of the invention, a task that claim-
ing now fulfills. 21 5 With the advent of claiming, written description law
evolved into a method to restrict the addition of new matter to a patent
application, limiting the priority date available to an applicant. 216
The Federal Circuit has expanded the written description beyond this
traditional role in recent years,2 17 resulting in numerous criticisms of this
212. See supra notes 12-43 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Koito Mfg. Co., v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 1142, 1155 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
214. See Janis, supra note 6, at 63-64.
215. Id.
216. See, e.g., In re Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Tronzo v. Biomet,
Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights
in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 830-31
(1999). As Mark Janis has explained, the role of the written description requirement tradi-
tionally arose in three circumstances: "(1) where claims were amended or newly-added
after the filing in a regular ex parte prosecution, raising an issue as to whether the claims
were entitled to the application's filing date; (2) where the patentee asserted that claims in
a later application were entitled to the benefit of the filing date of an earlier application
under § 120; and (3) where a party asserted that counts in an interference were supported
in a specification." Janis, supra note 6, at 59-60.
217. See LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1336, 1344-45 (Fed.
Cir. 2005); In re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1300, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Regents of the Univ. of
Ca. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Univ. of Rochester v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307-08 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, J., dissenting from
declination of en banc consideration) ("In 1997, this court for the first time applied the
written description language of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 as a general disclosure requirement in
place of enablement, rather than in its traditional role as a doctrine to prevent applicants
from adding new inventions to an older disclosure .... Neither Eli Lilly nor this case has




change.218 The Federal Circuit now examines whether the inventor pos-
sessed the invention under a separate and poorly articulated written
description requirement, even for embodiments of the invention de-
scribed in the originally filed claims. This shift in the law has created
considerable disagreement even within the Federal Circuit, with some
judges rejecting the distinction between enablement and written
description.219
These judges and commentators have been right to criticize the Federal
Circuit's expansion of the written description requirement. Aside from
the uncertainty it has created in the law,220 this shift belies the role of
enablement to show possession elsewhere in patent law. If the written
description were truly about assessing whether the inventor possessed the
invention, one would believe that the written description would also have
a role in assessing anticipation to determine whether the public actually
possessed the invention pursuant to the prior art. The written description
requirement plays no such role; only enablement is relevant to assessing
the adequacy of the prior art's disclosure. The lack of a role of written
description in any guise on the validity side of patent law strongly sug-
gests that enablement is the true test of possession and that the Federal
Circuit's expansion of the written description requirement is unfounded.
Further confirming the redundancy of these two standards is the PTO's
attempts to implement the written description requirement. The PTO it-
self has conflated enablement and written description. Under the PTO's
Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C.
112, 1, "Written Description" Requirement, the PTO adopted the "posses-
sion standard" articulated by the Federal Circuit.221 The Guidelines offer
that possession can be demonstrated by
[a] description of an actual reduction to practice, or by showing that
the invention was 'ready for patenting' such as by the disclosure of
drawings or structural chemical formulas that show that the inven-
tion was complete, or by describing distinguishing identifying charac-
teristics sufficient to show that the applicant was in possession of the
claimed invention. 222
218. See, e.g., Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation on the Description Requirement Gene, 80
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 209, 222 (1998); Rai, supra note 216, at 834-35; Mueller,
Evolving Application, supra note 14, at 617; Harold C. Wegner, When a Written Description
Is Not a "Written Description ": When Enzo Says It's Not, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 271, 274 (2002).
219. See Univ. of Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1307-14 (Rader, J., dissenting from declination
of rehearing en banc); id. at 1325-27 (Linn, J., dissenting from declination of rehearing en
banc).
220. See LizardTech, Inc., 453 F.3d at 1378 (Reader, J., dissenting); Duane M. Linstrom,
Spontaneous Mutation: A Sudden Change in the Fvolution of the Written Description Re-
quirement as it Applies to Genetic Patents, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 947, 970 (2003) ("[I]t has
also left us with even more uncertainty in the law than before the ruling."); Jennifer L.
Davis, Comment, The Test of Primary Cloning: A New Approach to the Written Description
Requirement in Biotechnological Patents, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
469, 487-88 (2004) ("[T]he court has not issued clear and consistent standards.").
221. Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, 1,
"Written Description" Requirement, 66 FED. REG. 1099, 1104 (Jan. 5, 2001).
222. Id.
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The first method-a showing of an actual reduction to practice-is simply
a confirmation of possession by a physical embodiment. The second ap-
proach, however, is the Pfaff "ready for patenting standard" from the on-
sale bar, which is the enablement standard. 223 The PTO has expressly
said that proof of a written description can be met by providing an ena-
bling disclosure. The federal agency with expertise in this area therefore
has conflated the two standards, suggesting strongly that any distinction
between written description and enablement is a false one.224 As Mark
Janis has noted, these Guidelines "do little to bring the written descrip-
tion requirement out from under the shadow of enablement." 225
This article has shown that enablement is best viewed as establishing
possession of an invention. Consequently, the present dichotomy of writ-
ten description and enablement should be rejected. Relegating written
description to its admittedly redundant role in policing new matter would
eliminate the numerous doctrinal difficulties that attend the current dif-
ferentiated approach. 226 The use of enablement to show possession is
more consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the patent system
and would provide greater certainty and consistency.
B. ENABLEMENT AS POSSESSION IN INFRINGEMENT AND
INVALIDITY DUE TO OFFERS TO SELL
Because enablement is correctly concerned with showing possession of
the invention, we can see an appropriate expansion of enablement in the
area of patent infringement. Patents afford the inventor the right to ex-
clude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell in the United
States, or importing into the United States the claimed invention.227 His-
torically, the courts have interpreted this provision to require the in-
fringer to create a physical embodiment of the invention in order to
infringe. 22 8 If a party can be "in possession" of the invention without
physically constructing it, as proven by an enabling disclosure, then the
time has come to reconsider the physicality requirement for infringement.
223. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
224. The third "describing by distinguishing characteristics" approach lacks any gui-
dance whatsoever. Indeed, for support, the PTO relies upon Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Phar-
maceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991), which unhelpfully notes that one
must define a compound by "whatever characteristics sufficiently distinguish it." The in-
quiry appears tautological. See Janis, supra note 6, at 71 ("Moreover, it simply restates the
standard to say, for example, that possession is shown by drawings that disclose "sufficient
detail" or written disclosure revealing "sufficiently detailed relevant identifying
characteristics.").
225. Janis, supra note 6, at 71.
226. See id. at 80-88.
227. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003).
228. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram, 406 U.S. 518, 517 (1972), supreceded by statute
35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2003). Section 271(f) provides infringement for the exporting of the
unassembled components of an invention or for an element of an invention that has no
substantial non-infringing use. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)-(2) (2003); see also Timothy R. Hol-
brook, Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for Offering in the United States to Sell an
Invention Abroad, 37 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 701, 720-21 (2004).
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Previously, I have articulated an appropriate dichotomy for patent in-
fringement that embraces this view of enablement as demonstrating pos-
session of a patented invention. 229 One view of infringement is that it is
an attempt by the infringer to appropriate the patentee's invention. Ap-
propriation can be thought of in two ways-the physical appropriation of
the invention and the economic appropriation. 230 Physical appropriation
can be seen as the right to exclude others from making, using, or import-
ing the invention-perform these acts, necessarily the invention must be
physically created. In contrast, the interest protected by the right to ex-
clude others from selling or offering to sell the invention is the economic
value of the invention.231 In the economic context, physical possession of
the invention is not a necessary prerequisite to the appropriation of the
invention, as a sale can take place based on a writing.
The on-sale bar standard confirms that an invention can be economi-
cally appropriate prior to its physical construction. The bar only requires
an enabling disclosure to show that the inventor has appropriated the
commercial value of the invention, thus impermissibly extending the pat-
ent term. If the inventor can appropriate the value of the invention prior
to its construction, it follows that an infringer can do the same as well.
Enablement provides a limiting and evidentiary tool to show that the in-
fringer was "in possession" of the invention in such a way as to economi-
cally appropriate its value.2 32 Enablement, thus, is the appropriate
standard to assess infringement for selling or offering to sell an invention.
C. CABINING THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS-No EQUIVALENTS
FOR WHAT THE INVESTOR POSSESSED OR SHOULD HAVE
POSSESSED AT THE TIME SHE
FILES HER APPLICATION
The concept of possession is also prevalent in the limitations on the
application of the doctrine of equivalents. This doctrine, by providing
non-literal protection to the patentee, can create considerable uncertainty
surrounding the scope of the patentee's right to exclude. To reduce this
uncertainty, the courts have articulated a variety of legal limitations on
the doctrine of equivalents. Review of these limitations reveals a consis-
tent theme: the courts will not allow the patentee to claim as equivalent
an embodiment of the invention that was or should have been in her pos-
session at the time she filed her application. As such, the appropriate test
should be that equivalency is precluded if the relevant evidence provided
229. Holbrook, Threat of Sale, supra note 172, at 801-15.
230. See id. at 805.
231. The economic harm from offering to sell an invention is primarily the price erosion
impact that the mere threat of the sale may create in the market. See id. at 791. The harm
from an actual sale could be price erosion and/or lost profit from the infringing sale. Id. at
790-98. Under either provision, patentees are guaranteed by statute, at minimal, a reason-
able royalty. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2005).
232. Concerns may be raised by fears of "paper infringement," but such infringement is
neither problematic nor unprecedented. See Holbrook, Threat of Sale, supra note 172, at
815-20.
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an enabling disclosure of the invention prior to the applicant's invention
date. This "possession" view of these limitations on the doctrine of
equivalents can be seen clearly in three particular limitations: the public
dedication rule, the foreseeability rebuttal of prosecution history estop-
pel, and the prior art preclusion rule.
1. The Johnson & Johnston Public Dedication Rule-Disclosures
Enable the Relevant Embodiment to Bar Equivalency
The role of possession in patent law, and thus enablement, can also be
seen in a number of the limitations on the doctrine of equivalents. One
such limitation is the public dedication rule, which precludes a patentee
from asserting equivalency over an embodiment of the invention that is
disclosed in the patent's specification but is not claimed. 233 The Federal
Circuit has adopted a bright-line, formalistic rule that any embodiment
disclosed but not claimed is dedicated to the public and thus is ineligible
for protection under the doctrine of equivalents. 234 The court did not
address, however, how sufficient the disclosure of the embodiment must
be to trigger this limitation on equivalency.
The sufficiency of the disclosure subsequently arose in two cases. In
PSC Computer Products, Inc. v. Foxconn International, Inc.,235 the court
confronted an invention directed toward clips used to secure a heat sink
to a microchip. 236 The patent claimed only metal clips, and the accused
device used plastic.2 37 The patent's specification noted merely that the
clip could be "made of a resilient metal such as stainless steel although
other resilient materials may be suitable" and that "other prior art de-
vices use molded plastic and/or metal parts. '238 The written description
was otherwise silent as to the material of the clip.
To address whether this rather meager disclosure in the specification
triggered the public dedication rule, the court reviewed the role that the
specification, pursuant to § 112, 1, plays in providing notice to the pub-
lic of the scope of the claims. The court concluded that
if one of ordinary skill in the art can understand the unclaimed dis-
closed teaching upon reading the written description, the alternative
matter disclosed has been dedicated to the public .... The disclosure
must be of such specificity that one of ordinary skill in the art could
identify the subject matter that had been disclosed and not
claimed.239
233. Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(en banc).
234. Id. at 1054.
235. 355 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
236. Id. at 1354-55. A heat sink is used to dissipate heat to cool the semi-conductor and
prevent it from becoming self-destructive. Id. at 1355.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1356.
239. Id. at 1360.
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Here, the court concluded that one of ordinary skill could identify the
plastic alternative and, thus, that embodiment was dedicated to the
public.2 40
The Federal Circuit appeared to posit that, in order to be dedicated to
the public, the embodiment must satisfy the disclosure obligations of
§ 112, 1 1. Such reasoning is consistent with the justification for the pub-
lic dedication rule espoused in Johnson & Johnston Associates v. R.E. Ser-
vice Co. In that case, the court reasoned that the patentee could have
claimed the disclosed embodiment but failed to do so. 241 In other words,
if the inventor was in possession of a particular version of the invention,
but failed to claim it, that variation falls into the public domain. Again,
possession by the inventor is central to the dedication rule. In order to be
able to claim an embodiment, the applicant must provide an enabling
description of it; otherwise, the relevant patent claim would be invalid.
Enablement again demonstrates whether the inventor possessed this par-
ticular variant of the invention.
For example, suppose an applicant patents an invention on a system
designed to run on a wire-based network. She explains in the specifica-
tion that the system has the potential to operate on a wireless system, but
the technology for such a system has yet to be invented. Arguably, she
has disclosed the invention but clearly would not be able to claim it be-
cause she did not-and indeed could not-provide an enabling disclo-
sure. PSC Computer Products suggests that such disclosure would not
preclude equivalency in that context because the inventor was not in pos-
session of that embodiment.
The court, however, has retreated from using § 112 as its litmus test for
the public dedication rule. While the court in PSC Computer Products
implied that § 112 would be the test, the court expressly eschewed that
approach in Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc.242 In that
case, the patentee argued directly that "the level of disclosure required to
trigger a dedication must satisfy the standards of patentability under 35
U.S.C. § 112."243 The court expressly rejected this argument, holding that
"the disclosure-dedication rule does not impose a § 112 requirement on
the disclosed but unclaimed subject matter. ' '244 Noting that § 112 is di-
rected to the adequacy of disclosure for the claimed invention, the court
concluded that "the level of disclosure needed to implicate the disclosure-
dedication rule is different from the level of disclosure required under
§ 112 to support claims defining the scope of the coverage of an inven-
tion. '2 4 5 The court thus held that the phrase, "without having the opera-
tor manually insert or remove a replaceable ring" dedicated the use of a
240. Id.
241. Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co, 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(en banc).
242. 383 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
243. Id. at 1333.
244. Id. at 1334.
245. Id.
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replaceable ring to the public, notwithstanding that the disclosure would
not have enabled the use of a replaceable ring in the claimed
invention.246
The Toro panel purported to rely upon the standard articulated in PSC
Computer Products to assess the adequacy of the disclosure. The Toro
opinion failed to acknowledge that the panel in PSC Computer Products
derived its standard from the § 112 disclosure obligations. While appear-
ing to apply PSC Computer Products, the Toro opinion disingenuously
eviscerated it. There appears to be an intracircuit conflict as to what con-
stitutes adequate disclosure for the public dedication rule. Indeed, the
Toro panel failed to articulate any metric to be used in applying the pub-
lic dedication rule. If the adequacy of the disclosure is not measured by
§ 112, then what is the appropriate standard? The PSC Computer Prod-
ucts test appropriately tied the adequacy to § 112 because the dedication
rule is in essence about possession; the inventor can only dedicate to the
public that which she possessed, as demonstrated by an enabling disclo-
sure of that embodiment of the invention.
2. Foreseeability Rebuttal of the Festo Presumption
The public dedication rule is not the only limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents impacted by focusing on the role of possession in patent law.
Prosecution history estoppel, when examined through the lens of posses-
sion, is more appropriately viewed as dealing with assessing whether the
patentee possessed the relevant equivalent during the prosecution of the
patent.
Prosecution history estoppel limits the ability of the patentee to assert
equivalents that she implicitly or expressly disclaimed while prosecuting
the patent at the PTO. Such surrender of the claim scope can occur when
the applicant amends a claim that, before the amendment, literally cov-
ered the asserted equivalent but, after the amendment, does not.247 Sur-
render can also occur if the applicant makes arguments that evince a clear
surrender of that subject matter.248
The Supreme Court has created a rebuttable presumption of prosecu-
tion history estoppel; if an applicant makes a narrowing amendment for
reasons related to the patentability of the invention, the applicant pre-
sumptively has surrendered all equivalents as to that amended limita-
tion.249 Because the presumption is rebuttable, a patentee can still assert
equivalency if the amendment bore only a tangential relationship to the
246. Id.
247. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733-34(2002) ("When, however, the patentee originally claimed the subject matter alleged to in-
fringe but then narrowed the claim in response to a rejection, he may not argue that the
surrendered territory comprised unforeseen subject matter that should be deemed
equivalent to the literal claims of the issued patent.").
248. Eagle Comtronics. Inc. v. Arrow Communication Labs., Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1316
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
249. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740.
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asserted equivalent, if the asserted equivalent was not foreseeable to one
of ordinary skill in the art at the time the applicant made the amendment,
or if it would be inappropriate to limit the patentee to the literal scope of
her claim.250 The "foreseeability" rebuttal, when properly considered, is
essentially an issue of possession.
The foreseeability inquiry asks whether the PHOSITA would have rec-
ognized that the asserted equivalent was available at the time of the
amendment. In other words, the test is assessing whether the patentee
should have been able to draft a claim that literally covered the asserted
equivalent device.251 In order to claim the equivalent literally, it must
have necessarily been within the grasp of the PHOSITA. In other words,
if the PHOSITA possessed the invention at the time the amendment was
made, then the patentee is foreclosed from asserting equivalency. Fore-
seeability is thus possession, which can be demonstrated through enabling
disclosures in the prior art contemporaneous to the amendment. If the
prior art, in combination with what the inventor has disclosed in her ap-
plication, would enable the asserted equivalent, then the patentee is pre-
cluded from using the doctrine of equivalents to recapture that
surrendered subject matter. Lack of an enabling disclosure rebuts the
presumption, permitting an assertion of equivalency. Thus, just as was
the case with the public dedication rule, the foreseeability standard is
truly about assessing whether the inventor was in possession of the as-
serted equivalent but failed to claim it.
3. Prior Art Preclusion of Equivalency Simply Asks if the Public
Already Possesses the Invention
Another important limitation on a patentee's ability to assert
equivalency is the prior art. A patentee cannot use the doctrine of
equivalents to ensnare an embodiment that is already in the prior art.252
The justification for this doctrine is that the "patentee should not be able
to obtain, under the doctrine of equivalents, coverage which he could not
lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal claims. '253 Just as the
prior art limits the literal scope of claims, it limits the range of available
equivalents.
The Federal Circuit has offered an optional methodology to assess
whether an asserted equivalent is in the prior art. A court is to create a
hypothetical claim, based on the claims at issue, that is rewritten to liter-
250. Id. at 740-41.
251. Id. at 741 ("The patentee must show that at the time of the amendment one skilled
in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have liter-
ally encompassed the alleged equivalent."). This reasoning is identical to that of the public
dedication rule of Johnson and Johnston, which is a test of possession. See supra notes 235-
47 and accompanying text.
252. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 683 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
253. Id. at 684.
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ally cover the asserted equivalent.254 If that hypothetical claim is antici-
pated or rendered obvious by the prior art, then necessarily the
equivalent is in the public domain; and the patentee is precluded from
asserting equivalency. 255
Prior art preclusion can also be viewed as simply determining whether
the public was already in possession of the invention. The patentee can-
not capture that which is already in possession of the public, as is the case
in assessing the novelty and obviousness of an invention. This possession
by the public would be demonstrated through an enabling disclosure.
The hypothetical claim methodology itself involves an assessment of an-
ticipation, which always requires an assessment of whether the prior art is
enabling.2 56 The obviousness analysis also implicates enablement in
terms of demonstrating possession of the invention.257 The court has not
expressly recognized this role for enablement in the prior art preclusion
doctrine, but it seems to be, in fact, the cornerstone of the inquiry. The
ultimate question is whether the public was in possession of the invention
of the asserted equivalent, which should be assessed by whether the prior
art would have enabled that equivalent.2 58 The patentee cannot assert
equivalency over that which the public already possessed. This assess-
ment of possession would differ from the public dedication rule and the
foreseeability rebuttal of prosecution history estoppel in that the relevant
references for determining enablement would only be the prior art; the
inventor's disclosures in the patent itself would not be used because they
are not part of the prior art.
D. OBVIOUSNESS AND THE MOTIVATION TO COMBINE-
IS IT REALLY JUST ENABLEMENT?
Along with enablement, judges have viewed obviousness as perhaps
the most important patentability doctrine. 259 Governed by 35 U.S.C.
§ 103, the obviousness doctrine prevents an applicant from obtaining a
patent on a trivial advance in the art, even though the invention may not
have been identically disclosed in the prior art. 260 Whereas each and
every claim limitation must be present in a single prior art reference to
anticipate an invention, obviousness is more flexible in that a combina-
254. Id. at 684-85. The Federal Circuit has arbitrarily mandated that a court may only
expand the scope of the claim when crafting a hypothetical claim; it cannot add limitations
that would contract the claim scope. Streamfeeder, LLC v. Sure-Feed Sys., Inc., 175 F.3d
974, 983-84 (Fed. Cir. 1999). This proscription is inappropriate. If a patentee can add a
narrowing limitation to the hypothetical claim so that the hypothetical claim still literally
covers the accused device while also avoiding the prior art, the accused device is necessa-
rily not in the prior art. Equivalency therefore should not be precluded.
255. Wilson Sporting Goods, 905 F.2d at 684-85.
256. See supra notes 152-170 and accompanying text.
257. See infra notes 262-80 and accompanying text.
258. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 49, at 1594.
259. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(Rader, J., dissenting from declination of rehearing en banc) ("Enablement, arguably the
most important patent doctrine after obviousness, has many important applications.").
260. MUELLER, supra note 25, at 131.
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tion of prior art references can be used to yield the claimed invention. In
other words, if the advance by the inventor would have been "obvious" to
one of ordinary skill in the art given the entire state of the prior art, a
patent is not available. Obviousness thus encourages the development of
larger "jumps" in innovation instead of affording protection for the incre-
mental development of technology that would occur even without a pat-
ent system.
At least, theoretically, that is the role that obviousness is to play in the
patent system. The Federal Circuit, according to some commentators,
has significantly lessened the ability of the obviousness requirement to
keep trivial advances from being patented. The modern standard for ob-
viousness was established by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John
Deere, where the court articulated the proper method to assess obvi-
ousness.261 A court must first evaluate the scope and content of the prior
art, second identify the differences between the prior art and the claimed
invention, and third consider the level of ordinary skill in the art.262 Fi-
nally, the court may look at secondary, non-technical factors that might
inform the analysis, such as the commercial success of the invention, the
failure of others to create the invention, and the existence of a long-felt
but unsolved need which the invention satiates.263
The Federal Circuit has elevated another factor as effectively determi-
native of the obviousness question-the existence of a motivation in the
prior art to combine the various references. 264 Because obviousness, un-
like anticipation, allows the combination of prior art references, the court
has generally scoured the prior art for some reason to make the combina-
tion (a "motivation to combine" the references).265 On the other hand, if
the prior art gives reasons to believe that making the combination would
be ineffective, then the court has concluded that such "teaching away"
from the claimed invention suggests that the invention is non-obvious.
Although arguably a mere subset of the "content of the prior art" prong
of Graham, the Federal Circuit has used this element essentially as an
independent fifth factor, raising its importance far above the other obvi-
ousness factors. The Court has actually found an invention to be non-
obvious, notwithstanding the presence of each and every claim limitation
in various pieces of prior art, simply because the prior art lacked a moti-
vation to combine those references. 266
The Federal Circuit has been quite formalistic in its application of the
motivation to combine criterion, which has generated criticism that the
261. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
262. Id. at 17.
263. Id. at 17-18.
264. See, e.g., Catalina Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F.3d 1277, 1288 (Fed. Cir.
2002); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court's Complicity in Federal Circuit
Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 3 (2003); John R. Thomas,
Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 773 (2003).
265. Catalina Lighting, Inc., 295 F.3d at 1288.
266. Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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court has significantly emasculated the obviousness standard. Techni-
cally, the motivation to combine could come not only from an express
writing in the prior art but also from the unexpressed knowledge of the
PHOSITA.267 The court, however, has looked for express teachings in
the prior art and has been loathe to rely simply on such unwritten knowl-
edge. 268 While requiring an express articulation of a motivation to com-
bine in the prior art provides evidentiary benefits, such an obligation
ignores the reality that the PHOSITA might think to combine the refer-
ences even without explicitly seeing the motivation somewhere in the
prior art. Consequently, many inventions obvious to the PHOSITA are
patented due to the lack of a written motivation to combine.
Under current law, enablement of a prior art reference plays no role in
the obviousness determination. 269 As enablement is only applied, in both
the validity and prior art contexts, to a single prior art reference, this is
undoubtedly correct. Because the single reference does not disclose the
entirety of the invention, the disclosure necessarily cannot be enabling
because part of the invention is missing.270 But deconstructing what the
Federal Circuit is doing with the "motivation to combine" doctrine
reveals that, in essence, the court is incorporating an enablement stan-
dard into obviousness. The court is asking whether the invention was
already in the possession of the public.
By requiring the motivation to combine, the court is in essence asking,
"if we combine these references together and treat them as a single prior
art reference, will the invention be disclosed sufficiently in the prior art?"
In other words, will the public domain be in possession of the invention
because the prior art will have enabled the invention through the combi-
nation of these references? In order to make that assessment, however,
the prior art must tell the public which references to combine. Otherwise,
the fractional pieces of the invention disclosed in the prior art are too
remote to be considered enabled. If the prior art teaches us to combine
the references, the court can legitimately consider those combined refer-
ences as a single reference and assess whether the prior art enables the
claimed invention.
Such reasoning, while beyond the court's express articulation of the
test, has analogous support in the anticipation context. Technically, an
invention is anticipated only if the prior art discloses the invention identi-
cally in a single prior art reference. One exception to this rule, however,
is when a piece of prior art incorporates another by reference.271 In such
267. See, e.g., In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
268. See In re Sang Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (rejecting use of "common
knowledge and common sense" to find a motivation to combine); see Rebecca S. Eisen-
berg, Obvious To Whom? Evaluating Inventions From The Perspective of PHOSITA, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 895 (2004).
269. See, e.g., Paperless Accounting, Inc. v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Sys., 804 F.2d 659,
665 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
270. See Holbrook, More Things Change, supra note 9, at 964-65 n.174.




circumstances, the single prior art reference is considered to encompass
not only its own express teachings but all of the teachings of the incorpo-
rated reference. 272 Thus, technically speaking, anticipation can be as-
sessed by multiple references,2 73 but the court views this as acceptable
because the incorporation by reference would show how the PHOSITA
would read that single reference; she would read it to encompass all of
the teachings of the other reference.274
That is precisely what the Federal Circuit is doing in the obviousness
context with the "motivation to combine" principle. The court is, in es-
sence, adopting "incorporation by reference" in the obviousness context
and then evaluating, once incorporated, whether the prior art would pro-
vide an enabling disclosure of the invention. 275 In other words, does the
prior art possess the entirety of the invention once all the relevant refer-
ences are properly combined? Under the Federal Circuit's approach, ob-
viousness now essentially states that if the prior art, when coupled with a
motivation to combine to bring all of the references together, would en-
able the creation of the invention, the invention is obvious and ineligible
for patent protection. 276
272. Id.
("Incorporation by reference provides a method for integrating material
from various documents into a host document-a patent or printed publica-
tion in an anticipation determination-by citing such material in a manner
that makes clear that the material is effectively part of the host document as
if it were explicitly contained therein.").
273. Another exception to the "one reference" rule for anticipation is inherent disclo-
sure. A reference can be anticipatory even if part of the invention is not expressly dis-
closed but is inherently disclosed. Other prior art references can be used to show that the
absent feature necessarily is present in the original piece of prior art. See Cont'l Can Co.
USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("To serve as an anticipation
when the reference is silent about the asserted inherent characteristic, such gap in the
reference may be filled with recourse to extrinsic evidence.").
274. Advanced Display Sys., Inc., 212 F.3d at 1283 ("Further, the standard of one rea-
sonably skilled in the art should be used to determine whether the host document describes
the material to be incorporated by reference with sufficient particularity.").
275. Of course, there are some odd inconsistencies with the Federal Circuit's opinions
in this regard. The ultimate question of anticipation is a fact question, yet the issue of
whether a piece of prior art incorporates another piece by reference is a question of law.
See id. ("Whether and to what extent material has been incorporated by reference into a
host document is a question of law."). In perplexing contrast, the ultimate question of
obviousness is legal, whereas the question of whether there is a motivation to combine
prior art references is one of fact. See Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta
AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This disparity is bizarre because in both circum-
stances, the court is in essence doing the same thing-reading the documents from the
perspective of the PHOSITA. Whether this is properly a legal or factual exercise is open
to debate, but clearly it should be one or the other and not the inexplicable and inconsis-
tent standard that presently exists.
276. While this explanation has considerable descriptive power, I admit that I disagree
with the Federal Circuit's current obviousness jurisprudence because the court has set the
standard for obviousness far too low. A heightened standard of obviousness could still be
consistent with an enablement inquiry if the proper role for the PHOSITA is established.
The PHOSITA likely has some ability to see what is in the possession of the inventor even
if not expressly stated. The PHOSITA could be the linchpin, then, in reconciling a height-
ened obviousness standard with a continuing view of enablement as evinces obviousness.
The Federal Circuit, however, has removed the PHOSITA from the obviousness analysis
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An interesting, although outlying, line of Federal Circuit cases confirms
that enablement and obviousness are both essentially about possession.
The Federal Circuit's predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals, noted that "[r]eferences relied upon to support a rejection under 35
USC [§]103 must provide an enabling disclosure, i.e., they must place the
claimed invention in the possession of the public. '277 The court itself
therefore conflated the enablement and obviousness analysis in that both
are essentially seeking to demonstrate possession.
This statement could be viewed as inconsistent with current law if the
enabling disclosure is specific to the individual references. A subsequent
Federal Circuit case has clarified, though, that non-enabled prior art ref-
erences are still relevant for the obviousness analysis, and thus the refer-
ence to enablement by the CCPA must mean that the prior art as a whole
must enable the invention. 278 Considering enablement as part of the ob-
viousness inquiry has shown little traction in the Federal Circuit, how-
ever. Admittedly, these cases all involve claims to chemical compounds;
in other contexts the need for the prior art to enable the invention may
not be a significant issue. Conspicuously, though, the rhetoric of obvi-
ousness demonstrating "possession" has fallen out of the Federal Circuit's
jurisprudence. 279
The approach articulated here would reconcile this line of cases with
the rest of the Federal Circuit obviousness jurisprudence. Possession is
conceptually the keystone to the obviousness inquiry, and enablement is
the best way to evaluate whether the public already possessed the inven-
tion. The Graham factors can properly be viewed simply as inquiries rel-
evant to the broader enablement inquiry. Indeed, if the differences
between the prior art and the claimed invention are slight, more likely
than not the invention would be enabled. Other factors relevant to en-
ablement could also be used to flesh out whether the public possessed the
invention or, in other words, if it was obvious.
E. RECOGNIZING ENABLEMENT'S PERVASIVENESS SIMPLIFIES
AND ENHANCES PATENT LAW
The idea of demonstrating the possession of an invention pervades pat-
ent law. Shifting the focus in these circumstances to possession, as shown
through an enablement inquiry, provides numerous benefits. To begin,
altogether by focusing on express disclosures in the prior art to the near exclusion of all
consideration of what the PHOSITA would know.
277. In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 314 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
278. See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1551 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) ("Even if a reference discloses an inoperative device, it is prior art for all that it
teaches.... In order to render a claimed apparatus or method obvious, the prior art must
enable one skilled in the art to make and use the apparatus or method."); see also In re
Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("Although published subject matter is 'prior
art' for all that it discloses, in order to render an invention unpatentable for obviousness,
the prior art must enable a person of ordinary skill to make and use the invention.").




use of enablement affords an already developed area of law as a basis for
exploring these other issues, which should facilitate greater maturation of
these doctrines, particularly in areas that are relatively nascent, such as
foreseeability rebuttal of prosecution history estoppel and the public ded-
ication rule. Moreover, imposing an enablement inquiry in these areas
adds simplicity to patent law; instead of being mired in various formula-
tions for what constitutes possession in one context versus another, law-
yers and the courts will rely on a single doctrine. Because these issues all
involve the issue of possession, it makes sense to treat them all in the
same fashion.
Finally, the central role of the PHOSITA in these assessments can
bring the proper perspective of a technologist, as opposed to a lawyer or
judge, to these issues.280 As Professors Burk and Lemley have offered,
the PHOSITA is a potent lever to effectuate innovation policy.2 8 1 Reli-
ance on the PHOSITA affords some discretion to the courts, and even
the PTO, to allow the development of the law to be informed by technol-
ogy-specific considerations. This flexibility allows tailoring of the law to
account for variations among the markets developing for a given
technology.
2 8 2
280. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 268, at 889-90 (noting Federal Circuit's marginalization
of PHOSITA).
281. Burk & Lemley, supra note 49, at 1648-51; see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lem-
ley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1202-05 (2002)
[hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific?].
282. See supra note 281. It is not clear if the "policy lever" approach advocated by
Burk and Lemley is truly a way to tailor patent law to assist in innovation efforts or, in-
stead, is merely patent law responding to developments that have already occurred. The
examples the authors provide-semi-conductor chips, biotechnology, and software-have
all evolved certain characteristics, but these characteristics evolved before application of
the patent law. The policy levers thus seem to be reacting to norms developed in the
technology area, instead of being the driver of the innovation norms.
Relying on the courts to implement these levers essentially guarantees that they can only
be reactive and not proactive. The courts cannot anticipate the advent of a new technology
any better than Congress, so these levers necessarily will be retrospective. Moreover, if a
case is before the courts via infringement litigation, then necessarily time has passed that
has made the litigation worthwhile, suggesting that some product is already on the market
and that the technology has already achieved some level of maturation. The courts can
only react subsequent to this evolution. Appeals directly from the PTO cannot adequately
anticipate technology needs because those cases will only reach the courts where there has
been a denial of protection. If a standard by the PTO is allowing either an overly restric-
tive view of obviousness or an overly narrowing view of enablement, then that issue may
reach the courts relatively contemporaneously with the invention. An example of this ap-
proach is the In re Fisher case, in which the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO's approach to
defining utility. See 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). But for circumstances where arguably
the legal standard is inappropriately broad and permissive, allowing patents to be granted
that should not have been granted, the Federal Circuit will not reach the issue until litiga-
tion arises because there will be no basis for the appeal. Although the court ultimately
agreed with the PTO's change in policy, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Finan-
cial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), epitomizes this scenario. There, the case
arose through litigation, which necessarily meant the PTO had begun to issue business
method patents.
The reactionary nature of these levers is not necessarily bad. Such reflective tailoring
involved may foster more rapid maturation of these fields. Patent law will not be the
driver, as is often suggested. Instead, it will respond to a given technology as it evolves.
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Importantly, the enablement inquiry in each of these various areas will
vary in terms of the timing of the inquiry and the relevant evidence to be
used. For example, the analysis of obviousness-as-enablement and prior
art preclusion rules will be made by taking into account only the prior art
at the time of the invention.283 In contrast, the enablement inquiry for
the public dedication rule would consider primarily the patent disclosure
itself. Also, the evidence considered in the foreseeability analysis would
differ because it would include the prior art and the disclosure of the
patent itself. The symmetrical beauty and theoretical accuracy of using
enablement to demonstrate possession does not mandate that all analyses
would be exactly the same, and enablement has the flexibility to accom-
modate these variables. 284 Enablement, once its view of having a "teach-
ing" function is relegated to the proverbial dustbin, provides an excellent
lens through which to analyze this core issue of possession.
VI. CONCLUSION
Patent theory has failed to adequately explain why all of the world's
patent systems insist on an enabling disclosure of the invention. The quid
pro quo view of the patent system is in fact at odds with the other theo-
retical justifications for a patent system. By shifting away from the view
that patents are designed to teach something, particularly in light of the
systemic impediments to this objective, the proper role of disclosure is
recognized as demonstrating possession of the invention. The best mech-
anism for measuring the fairly nebulous idea of "possession" is the en-
ablement doctrine. From this perspective, we can see how pervasive the
concept of possession, and accordingly enablement, is-and should be-
in patent law. This recognition would streamline the various strands of
patent law, greatly simplifying what is generally regarded as a hopelessly
complex area of the law.
This posture is far different from the classic view of patent law. Moreover, the courts must
be willing to depart from certain directions in order to reflect such evolution, which could
prove difficult for common law courts to do.
283. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2005).
284. But see Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific?, supra note 281, at 1202 (arguing for
a decoupling of the enablement and obviousness PHOSITAs). It is not clear that such
decoupling would be any different than simply recognizing the highly contextual nature of
the enablement inquiry. Burk and Lemley, in fact, offer no meaningful doctrinal or practi-
cal basis to perform such decoupling, other than noting that the obviousness PHOSITA is
an innovator while the enablement innovator is not. They fail to offer any substantive
manner of implementing such a difference on the already highly abstract PHOSITA.
In contrast, the knowledge differential between the two that Burk and Lemley reject
provides a precise, factually based method to distinguish the two situations. As enable-
ment and obviousness are both directed to showing possession of the invention, although
in different settings, the differential is also theoretically consistent and does not depend on
affording the already highly abstract PHOSITA personality traits. Indeed, a key eviden-
tiary difference will be the relevance of the patent disclosure itself; it is essential in assess-
ing whether the inventor was in possession of the invention, satisfying her disclosure
obligations, and it is utterly irrelevant in assessing whether the public possessed of the
invention under the obviousness standard. By maintaining a single, consistent but flexible
framework to demonstrate possession in these contexts, the flexibility espoused by Burk
and Lemley could be achieved.
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Admittedly, enablement doctrine itself is far from pristine. It is more
of a standard than a rule. A refinement of the current state of enable-
ment doctrine is beyond the scope of this article, but fuzziness in this area
may not be bad.285 As enablement is intimately connected to the
PHOSITA, it is a potentially powerful patent policy lever, as the above
review of its actual and potential pervasiveness in patent law demon-
strates. Enabling enablement doctrine its full ripeness will create simplic-
ity in the law and hopefully allow the PHOSITA to return to her
appropriate role as the arbiter of patent law.
285. Id. at 1639 (advocating standards-based patent system).
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